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Abstract
This paper describes formal specification and verification of Lamport’s Multi-Paxos
algorithm for distributed consensus. The specification is written in TLA+, Lamport’s
Temporal Logic of Actions. The proof is written and automatically checked using
TLAPS, a proof system for TLA+. The proof checks safety property of the specifi-
cation. Building on Lamport, Merz, and Doligez’s specification and proof for Basic
Paxos, we aim to facilitate the understanding of Multi-Paxos and its proof by mini-
mizing the difference from those for Basic Paxos, and to demonstrate a general way of
proving other variants of Paxos and other sophisticated distributed algorithms. We also
discuss our general strategies for proving properties about sets and tuples that helped
the proof check succeed in significantly reduced time.
Keywords. Distributed Algorithms, Formal Methods, Verification
1 Introduction
Distributed consensus is a fundamental problem in distributed computing. It requires that
a set of processes agree on some value or values. Consensus is essential when distributed
services are replicated for fault-tolerance, because non-faulty replicas must agree. Exam-
ples include leader election, atomic broadcast, and state machine replication in replicated
data storage services like Google File System, Apache ZooKeeper, Amazon DynamoDB, etc.
Unfortunately, consensus is difficult when processes or communication channels may fail.
Paxos [19] is an important algorithm, developed by Lamport, for solving distributed con-
sensus. Basic Paxos is for agreeing on a single value, such as whether to commit a database
transaction. Multi-Paxos is for agreeing on a continuing sequence of values, for example, a
stream of commands to execute. Multi-Paxos has been used in many important distributed
services, for example, Google’s Chubby [1, 3] and Microsoft’s Autopilot [13]. There are other
Paxos variants, for example, variants that reduce a message delay [22] or add preemption [20],
but Multi-Paxos is the most important in making Paxos practical for distributed services that
must perform a continuing sequence of operations.
Paxos handles processes that run concurrently without shared memory, where processes
may crash and may later recover, and messages may be lost or delayed indefinitely. In Basic
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Paxos, each process may repeatedly propose some value, and wait for appropriate replies
from appropriate subsets of the processes while also replying appropriately to other processes;
consensus is reached eventually if enough processes and channels are non-faulty to vote on
some proposal thus agreeing on the proposed value. In Multi-Paxos, many more different
attempts, proposals, and replies may happen in overlapping fashions to reach consensus on
values in different slots in the continuing sequence.
Paxos has often been difficult to understand since it was created in the late 1980s [24].
Lamport later wrote a much simpler description of the phases of the algorithm but only for
Basic Paxos [20]. Lamport et al. [25] wrote a formal specification and proof of Basic Paxos
in TLA+ [21] and TLAPS [34]. Many efforts, especially in recent years, have been spent
on formal specification and verification of Multi-Paxos, but they use more restricted or less
direct language models, some mixed in large systems with many unrelated functionalities, or
handle other variants of Paxos than Multi-Paxos, as discussed in Section 7. What is lacking
is formal specification and proof of the exact phases of Multi-Paxos, in a most direct and
general language like TLA+ [21], with a complete proof that is mechanically checked, and a
general method for doing such specifications and proofs in a more feasible way.
This article addresses this challenge. We describe a formal specification of Multi-Paxos
written in TLA+, and a complete proof written and automatically checked using TLAPS.
Building on Lamport et al.’s specification and proof for Basic Paxos, we aim to facilitate the
understanding of Multi-Paxos and its proof by minimizing the difference from those for Basic
Paxos. The key change in the specification is to replace operations involving two numbers
with those involving a set of 3-tuples, for each of a set of processes, exactly capturing the
minimum conceptual difference between Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos. However, the proof
becomes significantly more difficult because of the handling of sets and tuples in place of two
numbers.
This work also aims to show the minimum-change approach as a general way of specifying
and verifying other variants of Paxos, and more generally of specifying and verifying other
sophisticated algorithms by starting from the basics. We demonstrate this by further show-
ing the extension of the specification and proof of Multi-Paxos to add preemption—letting
processes abandon proposals that are already preempted by other proposals [20, 37]. We also
extended the specification and proof of Basic Paxos with preemption, which is even easier.
Finally, we discuss a general method that we followed to tackle tedious and difficult proof
obligations involving sets and tuples, a well-known significant complication in general. For
difficult properties involving sets, we use induction and direct the prover to focus on the
changes in the set values. For properties involving tuples, we change the ways of accessing
and testing the elements to yield significantly reduced proof-checking time. Overall, we were
able to keep the specification minimally changed, and keep the proof-checking time to about
3 minutes for both specifications while the prover checks the proofs for 779 obligations for
Multi-Paxos and over 825 obligations for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
This article is a corrected, improved, and extended version of [2]. The main changes are
as follows.
1. The claim of a complete proof in [2] was incorrect, and the problem discovered is now
fixed. The problem was due to an undocumented bug [29] in TLAPS that we discovered
after the work in [2], which made us realize that the proof of Multi-Paxos with Preemp-
tion was incomplete. We fixed this by adding the missing proof. This is described in
the new Section 5.1.
2. The proofs are simplified, shortened by 19% for Multi-Paxos and 17% for Multi-Paxos
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with Preemption, even with the added proof to overcome the TLAPS bug discovered.
In fact, it was during simplification of the proof that we discovered the bug. The
simplifications are described in the new Section 5.2.
3. Sections 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4 are extended to define and explain all auxiliary predicates,
acceptor invariants, and message invariants, respectively, that are used in the proof.
Section 6 is extended with detailed results about the different versions of proofs. Sec-
tion 7 is expanded with additional related works and more details about other proofs.
4. Section 5 is extended with a summary of the overall proof, in the new Section 5.3.
5. The complete, revised, and simplified TLA+ specification and TLAPS-checked proof of
Multi-Paxos with Preemption are added in the new Appendix C, including about 1.5
pages of specification, 1 page of invariants, and 9 pages of proof.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers preliminaries: distributed
consensus (Section 2.1), Paxos (Section 2.2), TLA+ (Section 2.3), and TLA Proof System,
TLAPS (Section 2.4). Section 3 presents the TLA+ specification of Multi-Paxos and compares
it with Lamport et al.’s specification of Basic Paxos [25]. Section 4 presents the auxiliary
predicates used throughout the proof (Section 4.1), the invariants proved (Sections 4.2, 4.3
and 4.4), and an overview of the main strategy used in the proof (Section 4.5). Section 5
describes the parts added to the specification of Multi-Paxos to support Preemption, and
the changes enumerated above. Section 6 summarizes the results from our specification and
proof. Section 7 discusses related work and concludes. The complete, cleaned up specification,
invariants, and proof can be found in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distributed consensus
A distributed system is a set of processes that process data locally and communicate with each
other by sending and receiving messages. The processes may crash and may later recover,
and the messages may be delayed indefinitely or lost. The basic consensus problem, called
single-value consensus, is to ensure that at most a single value is chosen from among the
values proposed by the processes. Formally, it is defined as
Safebasic , ∀ v 1, v 2 ∈ V : Chosen(v 1) ∧ Chosen(v 2)⇒ v 1 = v 2 (1)
where V is the set of possible proposed values, and Chosen is a predicate that given a value
v evaluates to true iff v was chosen by the algorithm. The specification of Chosen is part of
the algorithm.
The more general consensus problem, called multi-value consensus, is to choose a sequence
of values, instead of a single value. Here we have
Safemulti , ∀ v 1, v 2 ∈ V, s ∈ S : Chosen(s , v 1) ∧ Chosen(s , v 2)⇒ v 1 = v 2 (2)
where V is as above, S is a set of slots used to index the sequence of chosen values, and
Chosen is a predicate that given a slot s and a value v evaluates to true iff for slot s , value
v was chosen by the algorithm.
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2.2 Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
Paxos solves the problem of consensus. Two main roles of the algorithm are performed by
two kinds of processes:
• P, the set of proposers that propose values that can be chosen.
• A, the set of acceptors that vote for proposed values. A value is chosen when there are
enough votes for it.
A set Q of subsets of the acceptors, that is, Q ⊆ 2A, is used as a quorum system. It must
satisfy the following properties:
• Q is a set cover for A, that is,
⋃
Q∈QQ = A.
• Any two quorums overlap, that is, ∀Q1,Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∩ Q2 6= ∅.
The most commonly used quorum system Q takes any majority of acceptors as an element
in Q.
Basic Paxos solves the problem of single-value consensus. It defines predicate Chosen as
Chosen(v) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃ b ∈ B : sent(“2b”, a, b, v) (3)
where B is the set of proposal numbers, also called ballot numbers, which is any set that can
be totally ordered. sent(“2b” , a, b, v) means that a message of type 2b with ballot number b
and value v was sent by acceptor a. An acceptor votes by sending such a message.
Multi-Paxos solves the problem of multi-value consensus. It extends predicate Chosen to
decide a value for each slot s in S:
Chosen(s , v) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃ b ∈ B : sent(“2b”, a, b, s , v) (4)
To satisfy the Safe property, S can be any set. In practice, S is usually the natural numbers.
Figure 1 shows Lamport’s description of Basic Paxos [20]. It uses any majority of acceptors
as a quorum. Following Lamport et al. [25], in the specifications presented in this paper, the
prepare requests and responses have been renamed to 1a and 1b messages, respectively, the
accept requests and responses have been renamed to 2a and 2b messages, respectively, and
the number n is renamed to b and bal .
Multi-Paxos can be built from Basic Paxos by carefully adding slots. In Basic Paxos,
acceptors cache the value they have accepted with the highest ballot number. In Multi-Paxos,
we have a sequence of these values indexed by slot.
1. Phase 1a is unchanged.
2. In Phase 1b, the acceptors now respond with a set of triples in B × S × V as opposed
to just one ballot in B and one value in V.
3. In Phase 2a, the proposers now propose a set of pairs in S ×V instead of just one value
in V. Similar to Basic Paxos, the proposer executes Phase 2a once it has received a set
of responses for its 1a message from a quorum of acceptors and picks the value with
highest ballot number. But this is now performed separately for each slot in the set of
the triples received in the responses.
4. In Phase 2b, the acceptors now respond with a set of pairs in S × V as opposed to just
one value in V.
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Putting the actions of the proposer and acceptor together, we see that the algorithm
operates in the following two phases.
Phase 1. (a) A proposer selects a proposal number n and sends a prepare request
with number n to a majority of acceptors.
(b) If an acceptor receives a prepare request with number n greater than that of any
prepare request to which it has already responded, then it responds to the request
with a promise not to accept any more proposals numbered less than n and with
the highest-numbered proposal (if any) that it has accepted.
Phase 2. (a) If the proposer receives a response to its prepare requests (numbered
n) from a majority of acceptors, then it sends an accept request to each of those
acceptors for a proposal numbered n with a value v , where v is the value of the
highest-numbered proposal among the responses, or is any value if the responses
reported no proposals.
(b) If an acceptor receives an accept request for a proposal numbered n, it accepts
the proposal unless it has already responded to a prepare request having a number
greater than n.
A proposer can make multiple proposals, so long as it follows the algorithm for each
one. ... It is probably a good idea to abandon a proposal if some proposer has begun
trying to issue a high-numbered one. Therefore, if an acceptor ignores a prepare or accept
request because it has already received a prepare request with a higher number, then it
should probably inform the propose, who should then abandon its proposal. This is a
performance optimization that does not affect correctness.
To learn that a value has been chosen, a learner must find out that a proposal has
been accepted by a majority of acceptors. The obvious algorithm is to have each acceptor,
whenever it accepts a proposal, respond to all learners, sending them the proposal.
Figure 1: Lamport’s description of Basic Paxos in English [20].
5. Learning, as described in the last part of Figure 1, is changed to consider different slots
separately—a process learns that a value is chosen for a slot if a quorum of acceptors
accepted it for that slot in 2b messages.
2.3 TLA+
The specifications presented in this paper are written in TLA+, an extension of the Temporal
Logic of Actions (TLA) [28], a logic for specifying concurrent and distributed programs and
reasoning about their properties. In TLA, a state is an instantiation of the variables of the
program to values. An action is a relation between a current state and a new state, specifying
the effect of executing a sequence of instructions. For example, the instruction x : = x + 1
is represented in TLA and TLA+ by the action x ′ = x + 1. An action is represented by a
formula over unprimed and primed variables where unprimed variables refer to the values of
the variables in the current state and primed variables refer to the values of the variables in
the new state.
A program is specified by its actions and initial states. Formally, a program is specified
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as Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars where Init is a predicate that holds for initial states of the
program, Next is a disjunction of all the actions of the program, and vars is the tuple of all
the variables. The expression [Next ]vars is true if either Next is true, implying some action is
true and therefore executed, or vars stutters, that is, the values of the variables are same in
the current and new states. ✷ is the temporal operator always.
As a simple example, consider this specification of a clock based on Lamport’s logical
clock [27] but on a shared memory system:
variable c
Max (S ) , choose e ∈ S : ∀ f ∈ S : e ≥ f
Init , c = [p ∈ {0, 1} 7→ 0]
LocalEvent(p) , c ′ = [c except ![p] = c[p] + 1]
ReceiveEvent(p) , c ′ = [c except ![p] = Max ({c[p], c[1− p]}) + 1]
Next , ∃ p ∈ {0, 1} : LocalEvent(p) ∨ ReceiveEvent(p)
Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]〈c 〉
(5)
The system has two processes numbered 0 and 1. Variable c stores their current clock
values as a function from process numbers to clock values. Both processes start with clock
value 0, as specified in Init . LocalEvent(p) specifies that process p has executed some local
action and therefore increments its clock value. The expression c ′ = [c except ![p] = c[p]+1]
means that function c ′ is the same as function c except that c ′[p] is c[p]+1. ReceiveEvent(p)
specifies that process p updates its clock value to 1 greater than the higher of its and the
other process’ clock value. We define operator Max to obtain the highest of a set of values.
choose denotes Hilbert’s ǫ operator that returns some nondeterministically chosen term
satisfying the body of the choose expression if it exists, otherwise an error is raised.
2.4 TLAPS
TLA+ Proof System (TLAPS) is a tool that mechanically checks proofs of properties of
systems specified in TLA+. Proofs are written in a hierarchical style [26], and are transformed
to individual proof obligations that are sent to backend theorem provers. The primary backend
provers are Isabelle and Zenon, with the SMT solvers CVC3, Z3, veriT, and Yices as backups.
Temporal formulas are proved using LS4, a PTL (Propsitional Temporal Logic) prover. Users
can specify which prover they want to use by using its name and can specify the timeout for
each obligation separately.
As an example, we present the proof of a simple type invariant about the clock specification
in (5) — It is always the case that c ∈ [{0, 1} → N]:
TypeOK , c ∈ [{0, 1} → N]
theorem Inv , Spec ⇒ ✷(TypeOK )
〈1〉.use def TypeOK
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ TypeOK by def Init
〈1〉2.TypeOK ∧ [Next ]〈c 〉 ⇒ TypeOK
′
by def Next ,LocalEvent ,ReceiveEvent
〈1〉.qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTLdef Spec
(6)
The proof of theorem Inv is written in a hierarchical fashion. It is proved by two steps,
named 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2, and RuleINV1 by Lamport [28]. Proof steps in TLAPS are typically
written as:
〈x 〉y . Assertion by e1, . . . , em def d1, . . . , dn (7)
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Basic Paxos Multi-Paxos
Phase1a(b ∈ B) ,
∧∄m ∈ msgs : ∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal = b
∧Send([type 7→ “1a”,
bal 7→ b)
∧unchanged 〈maxVBal ,maxBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase1a(p ∈ P) ,
∧∄m ∈ msgs : ∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal = pBal [p]
∧Send([type 7→ “1a”, from 7→ p,
bal 7→ pBal [p]])
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted 〉
Figure 2: Phase 1a of Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
which states that step number 〈x 〉y proves Assertion by assuming e1, . . . , em , and expanding
the definitions of d1, . . . , dn . For example, step 〈1〉1 proves Init ⇒ TypeOK by expanding
the definition of Init . The qed step for 〈1〉 requires us to invoke a PTL prover because Inv is
a temporal formula.
3 Specification of Multi-Paxos
We give a formal specification of Multi-Paxos by minimally extending that of Basic Paxos by
Lamport et al [25].
Variables. The specification of Multi-Paxos has four global variables.
msgs: the set of messages that have been sent. Processes read from or add to this set. This
is the same as in the specification of Basic Paxos except that the contents of messages
are more complex.
pBal : per proposer, the current ballot number of the proposer. This is not in the specification
of Basic Paxos; it is added to support preemption.
aBal : per acceptor, the highest ballot number seen by the acceptor. This is named maxBal
in the specification of Basic Paxos.
aVoted : per acceptor, a set of triples in B×S ×V voted by the acceptor. For each slot only
the triple with the highest ballot number is stored. This contrasts with two numbers per
acceptor, in two variables, maxVBal and maxVal , in the specification of Basic Paxos.
Algorithm steps. The algorithm consists of repeatedly executing two phases.
Phase 1a. Figure 2 shows the specifications of Phase 1a for Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos,
which are in essence the same. Parameter ballot number b in Basic Paxos is replaced
with proposer p executing this phase in Multi-Paxos, to allow extensions such as Pre-
emption that need to know the proposer of a ballot number; uses of b are changed to
pBal [p]; and from 7→ p is added in Send . Send is a macro that adds its argument to
msgs, i.e., Send(m) , msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {m}. In this specification, 1a messages do not
have a receiver, making them accessible to all processes. However, this is not required.
For safety, it is enough to send this message to any subset of A, even ∅. For liveness,
the receiving set should contain at least one quorum.
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Basic Paxos Multi-Paxos
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal > maxBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
acc 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
maxVBal 7→ maxVBal [a],
maxVal 7→ maxVal [a]])
∧maxBal ′ = [maxBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈maxVBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal > aBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
from 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
voted 7→ aVoted [a]])
∧aBal ′ = [aBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aVoted 〉
Figure 3: Phase 1b of Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
Phase 1b. Figure 3 shows the specifications of Phase 1b. Parameter acceptor a executes
this phase. The only key difference between the specifications is the set aVoted [a] of
triples in Send of Multi-Paxos vs. the two numbers maxVBal [a] and maxVal [a] in Basic
Paxos.
Phase 2a. Figure 4 shows Phase 2a. The key difference is, in Send , the bloating of a single
value v in V in Basic Paxos to a set of pairs in S ×V given by PropSV in Multi-Paxos.
A proposal is a 〈s , v〉 pair. The operation of finding the value with the highest ballot in
Basic Paxos is performed for each slot by MaxSV in Multi-Paxos; MaxSV takes a set T
of triples in B×S×V and returns a set of pairs in S×V. NewSV generates a set of pairs
in S × V where values are proposed for slots not in MaxSV . This is significantly more
sophisticated than running Basic Paxos for each slot, because the ballots are shared
and changing for all slots, and slots are paired with values dynamically where slots that
failed to reach consensus values earlier are also detected and reused.
Phase 2b. Figure 5 shows Phase 2b. In Basic Paxos, the acceptor replies with the value
received in the 2a message whereas in Multi-Paxos, it replies with a set of pairs in
S × V received in the 2a message. Also, in Basic Paxos, the acceptor updates its voted
pair maxVBal [a] and maxVal [a] upon receipt of a 2a message of the highest ballot; in
Multi-Paxos, this is performed for each slot. The acceptor updates aVoted to have all
proposals in the received 2a message and all previous values in aVoted for slots not
mentioned in that message.
Complete algorithm specification. To complete the algorithm specification, we define
vars , Init , Next , and Spec, typical TLA+ macro names for the set of variables, the initial
state, possible actions leading to the next state, and the system specification, respectively:
vars , 〈msgs , pBal , aBal , aVoted 〉
Init , msgs = ∅ ∧ pBal = [p ∈ P 7→ 0] ∧ aBal = [a ∈ A 7→ −1] ∧ aVoted = [a ∈ A 7→ ∅]
Next , (∃ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) ∨ Phase2a(p)) ∨ (∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ∨ Phase2b(a))
Spec , Init ∧✷[Next ]vars
(8)
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Basic Paxos Multi-Paxos
Phase2a(b ∈ B) ,
∧∄m ∈ msgs : ∧m.type = “2a”
∧m.bal = b
∧∃ v ∈ V :
∧∃Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ msgs :m.type = “1b”∧
m.bal = b} :
∧∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.acc = a
∧ ∨ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = −1
∨∃ c ∈ 0..(b − 1) :
∧∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ c
∧∃m ∈ S : (m.maxVBal = c)
∧m.maxVal = v
∧Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])
∧unchanged 〈maxBal ,maxVBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase2a(p ∈ P) ,
∧∄m ∈ msgs : ∧m.type = “2a”
∧m.bal = pBal [p]
∧∃Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ msgs :m.type = “1b”∧
m.bal = pBal [p]} :
∧∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.from = a
∧Send([type 7→ “2a”,
from 7→ p,
bal 7→ pBal [p],
propSV 7→ PropSV (union
{m.voted : m ∈ S})])
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted 〉
MaxBSV (T ) , {t ∈ T : ∀ t2 ∈ T :
t2.slot = t .slot ⇒ t2.bal ≤ t .bal}
MaxSV (T ) , {[slot 7→ t .slot ,
val 7→ t .val ] : t ∈ MaxBSV (T )}
UnusedS (T ) , {s∈S : ∄t ∈T : t .slot = s}
NewSV (T ) , choose D ⊆ [slot :
UnusedS (T ), val : V] :∀ d1, d2∈D :
d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2 ∧D 6= ∅
PropSV (T ) , MaxSV (T ) ∪ NewSV (T )
Figure 4: Phase 2a of Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
Basic Paxos Multi-Paxos
Phase2b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧m.bal ≥ maxBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “2b”,
acc 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
val 7→ m.val ])
∧maxBal ′ = [maxBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧maxVBal ′ =
[maxVBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧maxVal ′ =
[maxVal except ![a] = m.val ]
Phase2b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧m.bal ≥ aBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “2b”,
from 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
propSV 7→ m.propSV ])
∧aBal ′ = [aBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧aVoted ′ = [aVoted except ![a] =
∪{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot ,
val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV }]
∪{e ∈ aVoted [a] :
∄ r ∈ m.propSV : e.slot = r .slot}
∧unchanged 〈pBal 〉
Figure 5: Phase 2b of Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
The complete specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption is given in Appendix A. Preemp-
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tion is discussed in Section 5. We only provide specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
because it is an extension of Multi-Paxos, thus also giving specification of Multi-Paxos would
be redundant.
4 Verification of Multi-Paxos and Proof Strategy
We first define the auxiliary predicates and invariants used, by extending those for the proof
of Basic Paxos with slots, and then describe our proof strategy, which proves Safe of Multi-
Paxos.
4.1 Auxiliary predicates
These predicates are used throughout the proof. Chosen(s , v) is true if there exists some
ballot b such that ChosenIn(b, s , v) holds.
Chosen(s ∈ S, v ∈ V) , ∃ b ∈ B : ChosenIn(b, s , v) (9)
ChosenIn(b, s , v) is true if there exists some quorum of acceptors such that for each ac-
ceptor in the quorum, VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) holds.
ChosenIn(b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) (10)
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) is true if acceptor a has voted value v for slot s in ballot b. This
is realized in the algorithm by sending a 2b message with ballot b and pair 〈s , v〉 in the
message’s proposals. Putting everything together, the algorithm chooses value v for slot s if
there exist some quorum Q and ballot b such that every acceptor in Q has voted value v for
slot s in ballot b:
VotedForIn(a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V) , ∃m ∈ msgs :
m.type = “2b” ∧m.from = a ∧m.bal = b ∧ ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = s ∧ d .val = v
(11)
Predicate SafeAt(b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V) means that no value except perhaps v has been or
will be chosen in any ballot lower than b for slot s . This is realized by asserting that for each
ballot b2 < b, there exists a quorum of acceptors such that for each acceptor in the quorum,
either VotedForIn(a, b2, s , v) holds or WontVoteIn(a, b2, s) holds.
SafeAt(b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V) , ∀ b2 ∈ 0..(b − 1) : ∃Q ∈ Q :
∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, v , b2, s)∨WontVoteIn(a, b2, s)
(12)
WontVoteIn(a, b, s) holds if acceptor a has seen a higher ballot than b, and did not and
will not vote any value in b for slot s
WontVoteIn(a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S) , aBal [a] > b ∧ ∀ v ∈ V : ¬VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) (13)
Predicate MaxBalInSlot(S ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S], s ∈ S) selects among set of elements in
S with slot s , the highest ballot, or -1 if no element has slot s .
Max (T ) , choose e ∈ T : ∀ f ∈ T : e ≥ f
MaxBalInSlot(T ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S], s ∈ S) ,
let E , {e ∈ T : e.slot = s}
in if E = ∅ then −1 else Max ({e.bal : e ∈ E})
(14)
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To prove the Safe property for the algorithm, we prove two properties:
1. Lemma VotedInv . If any acceptor votes any triple 〈b, s , v〉, then the predicate SafeAt(b, s , v)
holds. That is, ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)⇒ SafeAt(b, s , v).
2. Lemma VotedOnce. If acceptor a1 votes triple 〈b, s , v1〉 and acceptor a2 votes triple
〈b, s , v2〉, then v1 = v2. That is, VotedForIn(a1, b, s , v1) ∧ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v2)⇒
v1 = v2.
In fact, for other consensus algorithms, either Paxos extensions like Fast Paxos [22] and
Byzantine Paxos [23], or Paxos alternatives like Viewstamped Replication [30] and Raft [35],
safety can also be proven by asserting these two properties.
To prove these properties, we write invariants about the algorithm. We, following Lam-
port et al. [25], use three kinds of invariants: type invariants, process invariants, and message
invariants. These are sufficient because a distributed algorithm handles two kinds of data:
messages communicated and process local data. Correspondingly, we obtain message invari-
ants for the messages passed between processes and process invariants over the local data
that these processes maintain. Type invariants ensure that the specification always uses data
with correct types.
4.2 Type invariants
Type invariants are captured by TypeOK . They specify the sets of values that the variables
of the system can hold. For example, pBal ∈ [P → B] specifies the set of values pBal can
hold: for any proposer p in P, pBal [p] is in B.
Messages ,
∪ [type : {“1a”}, bal : B, from : P]
∪ [type : {“1b”}, bal : B, voted : subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V], from : A]
∪ [type : {“2a”}, bal : B, propSV : subset [slot : S, val : V], from : P]
∪ [type : {“2b”}, bal : B, from : A, propSV : subset [slot : S, val : V]]
∪ [type : {“preempt”}, bal : B, to : P,maxBal : B]
TypeOK ,
∧msgs ⊆ Messages ∧ pBal ∈ [P → B] ∧ aBal ∈ [A → B ∪ {−1}]
∧ aVoted ∈ [A → subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V]]
(15)
4.3 Invariants about acceptors
The following predicate specifies invariants about acceptor processes. For each acceptor a,
the first conjunct establishes the initial condition. The second conjunct says that a has voted
each triple in aVoted [a] and aBal [a] is higher than or equal to the ballot number of each triple
in aVoted [a]. The third conjunct states that if acceptor a has voted any value v in ballot b
for slot s , then there is some triple t in aVoted [a] such that t .bal ≥ b and t .slot = s . The last
conjunct says that acceptor a does not vote for a value in any ballot higher than the highest
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it has seen per slot.
AccInv , ∀ a ∈ A :
∧ (aBal [a] = −1)⇒ (aVoted [a] = ∅)
∧ ∀ t ∈ aVoted [a] : aBal [a] ≥ t .bal ∧VotedForIn(a, t .bal , t .slot , t .val)
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)⇒ ∃ t ∈ aVoted [a] : t .bal ≥ b ∧ t .slot = s
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a], s)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)
(16)
4.4 Invariants about messages
The following invariant is for a 1b message m, sent from an acceptor m.from. The first
conjunct says that the ballot number in m is no higher than the highest ballot number seen
by m.from. The second conjunct states that m.from has voted every triple 〈b, s , v〉 in the set
m.voted . The last conjunct asserts that for each slot s and ballot b higher than the highest
ballot that m.from has voted in for slot s , and lower than the ballot in m, m.from has not
voted any value in ballot b for slot s .
MsgInv1b(m) ,
∧m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from]
∧ ∀ t ∈ m.voted : VotedForIn(m.from, t .bal , t .slot , t .val)
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1..m.bal − 1
⇒ ¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v)
(17)
The following invariant is for a 2a message m. The first conjunct establishes safety for each
proposal d in m. The second conjunct says that two proposals in m with the same slot must
be the same proposal. That is, for each slot, there is at most one proposal in m. The third
conjunct says that there is at most one 2a message for each ballot.
MsgInv2a(m) ,
∧ ∀ d ∈ m.propSV : SafeAt(m.bal , d .slot , d .val)
∧ ∀ d1, d2 ∈ m.propSV : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2
∧ ∀m2 ∈ msgs : (m2.type = “2a”) ∧ (m2.bal = m.bal)⇒ m2 = m
(18)
The following invariant is for a 2b message m sent by acceptor m.from. The first conjunct
states that there exists a 2a message with the same ballot and same set of proposals as m.
The second conjunct asserts that the ballot of m is no higher than the highest ballot seen by
the sender of m.
MsgInv2b(m) ,
∧ ∃m2 ∈ msgs : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.propSV = m.propSV
∧m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from]
(19)
The complete message invariant is the conjunction of MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, and MsgInv2b:
MsgInv , ∀m ∈ msgs : ∧ (m.type = “1b”)⇒ MsgInv1b(m)
∧ (m.type = “2a”)⇒ MsgInv2a(m)
∧ (m.type = “2b”)⇒ MsgInv2b(m)
(20)
The complete invariants, auxiliary operators, and the safety property to be proved can be
found in Appendix B.
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4.5 Proof strategy
The main theorem to prove is Safety as defined in Equation (21). For this, we define Inv and
first prove Inv ⇒ Safe. Then, we prove Spec ⇒ ✷Inv which by temporal logic, concludes
Spec ⇒ ✷Safe. Note that property Safety is called Consistent , and invariant Safe is called
Consistency by Lamport et al [25].
Inv , TypeOK ∧ AccInv ∧MsgInv
Safe , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V, s ∈ S : Chosen(v1, s) ∧ Chosen(v2, s)⇒ v1 = v2
theorem Safety , Spec ⇒ ✷Safe
(21)
The proof is developed following a standard hierarchical structure and uses proof by
induction and contradiction. To prove Spec ⇒ ✷Inv , we employ a systematic proof strategy
that works well for algorithms described in the event driven paradigm. Distributed algorithms
are prime examples of this paradigm as they can be specified in blocks of code that are
triggered upon receiving a certain set of messages and finish by sending a set of messages.
We demonstrate the strategy for some invariants in Inv .
First, consider invariant TypeOK . The goal to prove is Spec ⇒ ✷TypeOK . Recall Spec ,
Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars :
• The induction basis, Init ⇒ TypeOK , is trivial in this case because the set of sent
messages is empty. TLAPS handles it automatically. This should be the case for
almost all distributed algorithms.
• The induction step is to prove TypeOK ∧ [Next ]vars ⇒ TypeOK
′, where the left side
is the induction hypothesis, and right side is the goal to be proved. [Next ]vars is a
disjunction of phases, as for any distributed algorithm, and TypeOK ′ is a conjunction
of smaller invariants, as for many invariants.
Now, the hypothesis of the induction step can be stripped down to each disjunct of Next
separately, and each smaller goal needs to be proved from all smaller disjuncts. This process
is mechanical, and TLAPS provides a feature for precisely this expansion into smaller proof
obligations. This breakdown is the first step in our proof strategy. For TypeOK , this expands
to 4 smaller assertions; with 4 phases in Next , we obtain 16 small proof obligations.
Proving complex invariants using invariance lemmas and increments. AccInv and
MsgInv are more involved. We proceed as we did for TypeOK and create a proof tree, each
branch of which aims to prove an invariant for a disjunct in Next . To explain the rest of
our strategy, we show a complex combination: MsgInv and Phase 1b. Equation (22) shows
the skeleton of the proof. The goal is to prove 〈4〉2, which states that MsgInv ′ holds if
acceptor a executes Phase 1b. 〈6〉1 proves MsgInv1b(m)′ and 〈6〉2 proves MsgInv2a(m)′ and
MsgInv2b(m)′.
Phase 1b sends a 1b message. Intuitively, 〈6〉2 should be easy because its goals are not
invariants about 1b messages. However, this is not the case because of predicate SafeAt ,
which is used in MsgInv2a. At this point the prover needs an invariance lemma.
Invariance lemma . An invariance lemma is a lemma that asserts that a predicate
continues to hold (or not hold) as the system goes from one state to the next in a single step.
This happens when a step does not affect the part of system state asserted by the predicates,
and requires more complex proofs otherwise. For example, the invariance lemma for SafeAt
states that SafeAt continues to hold for any disjunct in Next , which includes Phase 1b. The
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characteristic property of such lemmas is their reuse. In our proof of Multi-Paxos, we defined
5 invariance lemmas which are used in 27 places.
Lastly, we need to prove 〈6〉1. Since 〈6〉1 is about 1b messages, and Phase 1b generates such
a message, the proof is more complicated, and the prover needs more manual intervention.
Here we split the set of messages in the new state into two sets: 〈7〉1 for the old messages,
and 〈7〉2 for the increment, the new message sent in this step. For the old messages, we use
invariance lemmas. The most challenging case is for the increment.
Increment . An increment is a new message sent in a phase or generally a new element
in a set. In the example of Equation (22), the increment is m1 and we focus on the cause of
the increment—available here in the definition of Phase 1b—and prove each conjunct of the
goal MsgInv1b(m1)′ separately in 〈5〉2, 4, 12. The prover proves 〈5〉2 by just the definition of
Phase 1b. For 〈5〉4, along with the definition of Phase 1b, the prover also needs invariance
lemma for VotedForIn for Phase1b. 〈5〉12 requires, along with the definition of Phase 1b
and invariance lemmas, case-specific manual intervention. Specifically, we helped the prover
understand the change in limits of the set MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1..m1.bal − 1. The
proof extended one more level for case 〈7〉2.
〈4〉2.assume new a ∈ A,Phase1b(a) prove MsgInv ′
〈5〉.define m1 , [type 7→ “1b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , voted 7→ aVoted [a]]
〈5〉2.(m1.bal ≤ aBal [m1.from])′ . . .
〈5〉4.(∀ r ∈ m1.voted : VotedForIn(m1.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val))′ . . .
〈5〉12.(∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1..m1.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m1.from, b, s , v))′ . . .
...
〈6〉assume new m2 ∈ msgs ′ prove MsgInv ′
〈6〉1.(m2.type = “1b” ⇒ MsgInv1b(m2))′
〈7〉1.case m2 ∈ msgs . . .
〈7〉2.case m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs . . .
〈6〉2.((m2.type = “2a” ⇒ MsgInv2a(m2)) ∧ (m2.type = “2b” ⇒ MsgInv2b(m2)))′ . . .
(22)
Induction for properties over sets, and ways of accessing elements of tuples. With
the above strategy, we were still faced with certain assertions that were difficult to prove. One
of the main difficulties lay in proving properties about tuples and sets of tuples for each of a
set of processes in Multi-Paxos, as opposed to one or two values for each of a set of processes
in Basic Paxos. It may appear that, in many places, this requires simply adding an extra
parameter for the slot, but the proof became significantly more difficult: even in places where
an explicit inductive proof is not needed, auxiliary facts had to be added to help TLAPS
succeed or proceed sufficiently fast.
For example, adding slots to the proof of theorem Safety for Basic Paxos caused the
prover to take about 90 seconds to check it. To aid the proof, we added ∃ a ∈ A :
VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v1)∧VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v2) as an intermediate fact derivable from b1 =
b2∧ChosenIn(b1, s , v1)∧ChosenIn(b2, s , v2) (step 〈3〉1 of step 〈2〉1 in the proof of theorem
Safety). Following this, the prover asserted the conclusion v 1 = v 2 in a few milliseconds, a
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10,000 time speedup.
Tuples have only a fixed number of components and therefore do not require separate
inductive proofs, but they often turn out to be tricky and require special care in choosing the
ways to access and test their elements, to sufficiently reduce TLAPS’s proof-checking time
and observe progress. For example, consider the definition of VotedForIn in Equation (11).
Originally [slot 7→ s , val 7→ v ] ∈ m.propSV was written for the last conjunct with existential
quantification, because it was natural, but it had to be changed to ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot =
s ∧ d .val = v , because the prover made more observable progress. With the original version,
the proof did not carry through after 1 or 2 minutes. After the change, the proof proceeded
quickly. One minute of waiting for such simple, small tests felt very long, making it uncertain
whether the proof would carry through.
5 Multi-Paxos with Preemption, and overall proof
Preemption is described informally in Lamport’s description of Basic Paxos in Figure 1, in
the paragraph about abandoning a proposal number. Preemption has an acceptor reply to a
proposer, in both Phases 1b and 2b, if the proposer’s ballot is preempted i.e., the acceptor
has seen a higher ballot than the one just received from the proposer. This reply informs the
proposer of the highest ballot the acceptor has seen, and the proposer can abandon its lower
ballot number.
NewBal(b2 ∈ B) , choose b ∈ B : b > b2 ∧ ∄m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1a” ∧m.bal = b
Preempt(p ∈ P) , ∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “preempt”
∧m.to = p
∧m.bal > pBal [p]
∧ pBal ′ = [pBal except ![p] = NewBal(m.bal)]
∧unchanged 〈msgs , aBal , aVoted 〉
Phase 1b without Preemption Phase 1b with Preemption
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal > aBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
from 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
voted 7→ aVoted [a]])
∧aBal ′ = [aBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aVoted 〉
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧ifm.bal > aBal [a] then
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
from 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal ,
voted 7→ aVoted [a]])
∧aBal ′ = [aBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aVoted 〉
else
∧Send([type 7→ “preempt” ,
to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]])
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted 〉
Figure 6: Extension of Multi-Paxos to Multi-Paxos with Preemption
To specify Preemption, each of Phases 1b and 2b adds a new case for when the acceptor
receives a lower ballot than the highest ballot it has seen. We also define predicate Preempt
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that specifies how proposers update pBal upon receiving a preempt message. Figure 6 shows
Phase 1b with and without the modifications to add Preemption. Modifications to Phase 2b
are similar.
Preemption adds a new phase, Preempt , as a passive action in Next , modifies definitions
of existing phases, and adds a new type of message. This new phase increases the width of
the proof tree. Except for TypeOK , this new branch of the proof was proven by asserting
invariance lemmas established earlier. The entire task of adding the new parts of specification
and proof, except for the proof of TypeOK , took less than an hour.
5.1 Remedial proof for TypeOK
The invariance of TypeOK , i.e., ✷TypeOK , was automatically checked previously [2] by in-
structing TLAPS to use its PTL (Propositional Temporal Logic) backend prover. However,
we later discovered that due to an undocumented bug in TLAPS [29], using PTL in this way
causes incorrect obligations to be marked correct. This bug lets one prove that a primed
formula is true if its unprimed form is an assumption. A primed formula is one with only
primed variables and constants. For example, x ′ = 0 is primed but x ′ = x + 1 and x = 0
are not. The unprimed form of x ′ = 0 is x = 0. Thus, TLAPS incorrectly verifies TypeOK ′
under the assumption TypeOK ∧ [Next ]vars .
As a remedy, we here provide the missing proof of invariance of TypeOK . Using our proof
strategy, writing this proof of invariance took a matter of minutes for Multi-Paxos. The
remedial proof of TypeOK is longer by 39 lines (72%), increasing from 54 for the previous
incomplete proof [2] to 93 , and took 3 seconds (30%) more for TLAPS to check, from 10 to
13 seconds here.
For Multi-Paxos with Preemption, our strategy failed at first because the invariants were
not strong enough. Preemption adds the conjunct pBal ∈ [P → B] to TypeOK . Upon
preemption, proposer p changes pBal [p] to ballot b such that (i) no 1a message has been sent
yet with b as ballot, and (ii) b is higher than the ballot of the preempting message. To prove
that ✷pBal ∈ [P → B], we need to establish that such a b indeed exists.
To this end, we strengthen our invariants by adding the fact that msgs is always a finite
set, i.e., IsFiniteSet(msgs). We add this as a conjunct in TypeOK . Now, it can be proven
that only a finite number of 1a messages exist. Thus, only a finite number of ballots can ever
be used. Because B is infinite, there will always be some ballot available to be chosen. We
prove this constructively by providing the prover with a witness: a ballot that is 1 greater
than the highest ballot in 1a messages. This remedial proof of TypeOK is 63 lines (84%)
longer, increasing from 75 for the previous incomplete proof [2] to 138, and took 29 seconds
(242%) more for TLAPS to check, from 12 to 41 seconds here.
Table 1 summarizes the results.
5.2 Overall proof improvement
To make the proof easier to read and understand, we made three main kinds of improve-
ments. These improvements apply to the proofs for both Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with
Preemption, but the numbers presented are for the proof of Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
1. Refined invariants. MsgInv is now defined as a conjunction of three new predicates
MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, and MsgInv2b, in (17)-(19), which were not separate predicates
in the proof for [2], even though the names were used in the text for ease of presentation.
This introduction of intermediate predicates reduced the proof size by 75 lines, because,
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at 12 places, the new names are used in place of their expanded definitions. This also
reduced the proof-checking time by about 2 seconds, because now only the portions of
MsgInv that one needed for examination in the proof are instructed to be expanded.
2. Merged proof cases. Cases with similar proofs are merged into a single proof. For
example, to prove that AccInv continues to hold when acceptor a executes Phase 1b
with Preemption, there are three cases to consider for each acceptor a2 in A: (1) if a2
is not a, (2) if a2 is a, and it sends a preempt message in this action, and (3) if a2 is
a, and it sends a 1b message in this action. The proofs for cases (1) and (2) are similar
because in both cases, a2’s state does not change. We found 5 instances in the proof
described in [2] where such cases were handled separately, creating unnecessarily longer
proof. Merging them resulted in an overall reduction of 27 lines of proof and slightly
reduced (by less than 2 seconds) proof-checking times.
3. Removed unnecessary obligations. When TLAPS fails to prove an assertion, a
proof must be manually written to be checked automatically by TLAPS. We discovered
that parts of these manually written proofs described in [2] are unnecessary because
they can be found automatically by TLAPS. About 25 instances of these were removed
causing 110 lines of proof to be removed and the proof-checking times to reduce by
around 20 seconds. An additional 22 instances were removed from the remedial proof
for TypeOK , totalling to 61 lines of proof and reducing its checking time by 5 seconds.
Metric
Multi-Paxos Multi- w/ Preemption
Old [2] Remedial Improved Old [2] Remedial Improved
Proof Remedial Proof Remedial
Proof Proof
Proof size 54^^ 93 54 75^^ 138 77
CPU check time (seconds) 10^^ 13 4 12^^ 41 12
Elapsed check time (seconds) 20^^ 22 8 21^^ 35 25
Table 1: Proof statistics for remedial proof of TypeOK and improvements on it. Proof size is
measured as non-empty lines excluding comments.
^^ indicates an incorrect number from the incomplete proof due to the TLAPS bug [29].
5.3 Overall proof summary
The proof for Multi-Paxos with Preemption spans about 9 pages, and is summarized below:
1. Auxiliary predicates and invariants span about 1 page.
2. Helper lemmas and their proofs are about 1.5 pages. They are used to prove helpful
properties of operators MaxBalInSlot , NewSV , and MaxSV . This also includes proofs
for lemmas VotedInv and VotedOnce.
3. The invariance lemmas and their proofs are less than 1 page.
4. The proof of type invariant TypeOK is 1 page, using only a 1-level proof for each action.
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5. The proof of acceptor invariant AccInv is 1.5 pages, using a 5-level proof for action
Phase2b because only Phase2b changes variable aVoted which affects AccInv . The
proofs for other actions are only 1-level because of their independence from AccInv .
6. The proof of message invariant MsgInv is a little over 4 pages, using 4-level proofs for
actions Phase1b and Phase2b taking about 1 page each, and a 6-level proof for Phase2a
taking 2 pages, because MsgInv is over messages sent in these actions. The proof is
long and complex in particular because each message is a record and its contents may
contain sets of records.
7. The proof of theorem Safety using Spec ⇒ ✷Inv is less than half a page with a straight-
forward argument of Inv ⇒ Safe.
The complete TLAPS-checked proof is given in Appendix C.
6 Results of TLAPS-checked proofs
Table 2 summarizes the results from our specification and proof. Some mistakes in the
counting logic of the result generating script caused incorrect numbers to be reported in [2]
for specification and proof sizes and number of proofs by contradiction. These errors have
been corrected here.
• The specification size grew by only 3 lines (6%), from 52 lines for Basic Paxos to 55
lines for Multi-Paxos; another 19 lines (35%) are added for Preemption.
• Overall, the proof size increased significantly by 477 lines (154%), from 310 for Basic
Paxos to 787 for Multi-Paxos, due to the complex interaction between slots and ballots;
only 44 more lines (6%) were added for Preemption, thanks to the reuse of all lemmas,
especially invariance lemmas. As mentioned in Section 5.1, adding the remedial proof
to the incomplete proof reported in [2] initially increased the proof size by 39 lines (4%)
from 1010 to 1049 for Multi-Paxos and by 63 lines (6%) from 1054 to 1117 for Multi-
Paxos with Preemption. However, the proof improvements decreased these numbers by
262 lines (25%) from 1049 to 787 for Multi-Paxos and by 286 lines (26%) from 1117 to
831 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• The maximum level of proof tree nodes increased from 7 to 10 going from Basic Paxos
to Multi-Paxos but remained 10 after adding Preemption; this contrast is even stronger
for the maximum degree of proof tree nodes, consistent with the challenge of going to
Multi-Paxos. The proof improvements reduced the maximum level of proof tree nodes
by 1 for both Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption compared with [2].
• The increase in number of lemmas is due to the change from Max in Basic Paxos to
MaxBalInSlot in Multi-Paxos, defined in Equation (14). Five lemmas were needed for
this predicate alone to aid the prover, as we moved from scalar values to a set of tuples
for each acceptor.
• No proof by induction on set increment is used for Basic Paxos. Four such proofs are
used for Multi-Paxos and for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• Proof by contradiction is used twice in the proof of Basic Paxos, and we extended
them with slots in the proof of Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption. We use
contradiction proofs one more time in our proofs in lieu of longer constructive proofs.
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• The number of proof obligations for the prover increased most significantly, by 540
(226%), from 239 for Basic Paxos to 779 for Multi-Paxos. Only another 46 (6%) proof
obligations were generated for Multi-Paxos with Preemption. However, the number of
obligations decreased by 139 (15%) from 918 in [2] to 779 for Multi-Paxos and by 134
(14%), from 959 in [2] to 825 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• The checking time of invariance proof of TypeOK increased by 3 seconds (300%) from 1
for Basic Paxos to 4 for Multi-Paxos due to the more complicated structures involved in
Multi-Paxos. It further increased by 8 seconds (200%) from 4 to 12 when Preemption
was added. This is due to new aspects in the remedial proof of TypeOK as explained
in Section 5.1.
• The checking time of the total proof increased by 135 seconds (338%), from 40 for Basic
Paxos to 175 for Multi-Paxos, despite our continuous efforts to help the prover reduce
it. This is because of the greatly increased size and complexity of inductions, leading
to significantly more obligations for the prover. A small increase of 5 seconds (3%) is
observed when Preemption is added. As a result of the proof improvements, we notice
a 53 second decrease (23%, from 228 to 175) and a 42 second decrease (19%, from 222
to 180) in the proof checking time for Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
7 Related work and conclusion
We discuss closest related results on verification of Paxos, categorized by the verification
techniques.
Model checking. Lamport has written TLA+ specifications for Basic Paxos and its variants,
e.g., Fast Paxos [22], and checked them using the TLA+ model checker TLC [33], but not
for Multi-Paxos or its variants; a number of MS students at our university have also done
this in course projects, including for Multi-Paxos. Delano et al. [8] modeled Basic Paxos
in Promela and checked it using the Spin model checker [40]. To reduce the state space,
they use counting guards to track majority, reset local variables after state operations, and
use sorted send instead of FIFO send (with random receive, to model non-FIFO channels).
They checked Basic Paxos for pairs of numbers of proposers and acceptors up to (2,8), (3,5),
(4,4), (5,3), and (8,2). Yabandeh et al. [44] checked a C++ implementation of Basic Paxos
using CrystalBall, a tool built on Mace [16], which includes a model checker. Yang et al. [45]
used their model checker MoDist to check a Multi-Paxos-based service system developed by a
Microsoft product team [31]. With dynamic partial-order reduction [10], they found 13 bugs
including 2 bugs in the Paxos implementation, with as few as 3 replicas and a few slots. In
all cases, existing work in model checking either does not check Multi-Paxos or can check it
for only a very small number of processes and slots.
Deductive verification. Kellomäki [15] formally specified and verified Basic Paxos using
PVS [41]. Charron-Bost and Schiper [5] expressed Basic Paxos in the Heard-Of model, and
Charron-Bost and Merz [4] verified it formally using Isabelle/HOL [42]. Drăgoi et al. [9] spec-
ified and verified a version of Basic Paxos in PSync, which is based on the Heard-Of model, so
the specification and proof are similar to [5, 4]. Lamport et al. [25] give a formal specification
of Basic Paxos in TLA+ and a TLAPS-checked proof of its correctness. Lamport [23] wrote
a TLA+ specification of Byzantine Paxos, a variant of Basic Paxos that tolerates arbitrary
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Metric
Basic Multi-Paxos Multi- w/ Preemption
Paxos Old [2] New Old [2] New
Spec size (lines, excl. comments) -, 52 -, 56 55 -, 75 74, 52*
Proof size (lines, excl. comments) -, 310 -, 1010^^ 787 -, 1054^^ 831, 528*
Spec size incl. comments (lines) 115^, 106 133^, 123 115 158^, 151 144, 76*
Proof size incl. comments (lines) 423^, 432 1106^, 1096^^ 868 1136^, 1143^^ 915, 613*
Max level of proof tree nodes 7 11 10 11 10
Max degree of proof tree nodes 3 17 17 17 17
# lemmas 4 11 11 12 12
# invariance lemmas 1 5 5 6 6
# uses of invariance lemmas 8 27 27 29 29
# proofs by induction on set increment 0 4 4 4 4
# proofs by contradiction 1^, 2 1^, 3 3 1^, 3 3
# obligations in TLAPS 239 918^^ 779 959^^ 825
TypeOK CPU check time (seconds) -, 1 -, 10^^ 4 -, 12 12
Total CPU check time (seconds) -, 40 -, 228^^ 175 -, 222^^ 180
TypeOK elapsed check time (seconds) -, 1 -, 20^^ 7 -, 22^^ 24
Total elapsed check time (seconds) 24**, 14 128**, 63^^ 51 94**, 69^^ 90
Table 2: Summary of results. An obligation is a condition that TLAPS checks. The check
time is on a 4-core Intel i7-4720HQ 2.6 GHz CPU with 16 GB of memory, running 64-bit
Ubuntu 17.10 and TLAPS 1.5.6.
- denotes an entry not in [2], followed by the now added measurement.
^ indicates a number with a count oversight in [2], followed by the now correct count.
^^ indicates an incorrect number from the incomplete proof due to the TLAPS bug [29].
** indicates a number that used TLAPS version 1.5.3 in [2], followed by the number using
the new version 1.5.6.
* indicates a number for the specification or proof in Appendix C, after removing unnecessary
line breaks from default latex generated by TLA+ Tools.
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failures, and a TLAPS-checked proof that it refines Basic Paxos. Küfner et al. [18] exhibit
a methodology to develop machine-checkable parameterized proofs of correctness of fault-
tolerant round-based distributed algorithms with Basic Paxos as a case study. Their proof is
approximately 10,000 lines in Isabelle/HOL.
With IronFleet, Hawblitzel et al. [11] verified a state machine replication system that uses
Multi-Paxos at its core. Their specification mimics TLA+ models but is written in Dafny [38],
which has no direct concurrency support but has more automated proof support than TLAPS.
This work is superior to its peers by proving not only safety but also liveness properties.
However, it is a complex system, with 3 levels and many components of specifications, over
1000 lines, and proofs, over 30,000 lines. Schiper et al. [39] used EventML [36] to specify
Multi-Paxos and used NuPRL [7] to verify safety. Using the Verdi framework, Wilcox et
al. [43] expressed Raft [35], an algorithm similar to Multi-Paxos, in OCAML and verified it
using Coq [12]. The proof is over 50,000 lines and takes almost 30 minutes to verify. Padon
et al. [32] specify many variants of Paxos including Basic and Multi-Paxos in first-order
logic. They present a methodology aiming at automatic verification based on effectively
propositional logic (EPR).
All these works either do not handle Multi-Paxos or handle it using more restricted or less
direct language models than TLA+, some mixed in large systems, making the essence of the
algorithm’s proof harder to find and understand.
In contrast, our work is the first to specify the exact phases of Multi-Paxos in a most direct
and general language model, TLA+, with a complete correctness proof automatically checked
using TLAPS. Building on Lamport et al.’s specification and proof for Basic Paxos [25], we
aim to facilitate the understanding of Multi-Paxos and its proof by minimizing the difference
from those for basic Paxos. We further show this as a general way for specifying and proving
variants of Multi-Paxos, by doing so for Multi-Paxos extended with preemption. We also
discuss the significantly more complex but necessary subproofs by induction. Future work
may automate inductive proofs and support the verification of variants that improve and
extend Multi-Paxos, by extending specifications of variants of Paxos, e.g., Fast Paxos [22]
and Byzantine Paxos [23], to Multi-Paxos and verifying these variants of Multi-Paxos as well
as Raft [35].
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A TLA+ specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
module MultiPaxosSpec
This is a specification in TLA+ and machine checked proof in TLAPS of Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
extends Integers , TLAPS , FiniteSets , FiniteSetTheorems
constants P , A, Q, V Sets of proposers, acceptors, quorums of acceptors, and values to propose
variables msgs , Set of sent messages
pBal , For each proposer, the current ballot of the proposer
aBal , For each acceptor, the highest ballot seen by the acceptor
aVoted For each acceptor, a subset of 〈ballot , slot , value〉 triples that the acceptor has voted
assume QuorumAssumption , Q ⊆ subset A∧ ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅
B , N Set of ballots
S , N Set of slots
vars , 〈msgs , pBal , aBal , aVoted〉
Send(m) , msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {m}
Phase 1a: For a proposer p, this phase selects some ballot number pBal [p] with which a 1a message has not
been sent, and sends it (to all processes).
Phase1a(p) , ∧ ∄m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1a” ∧m.bal = pBal [p]
∧ Send([type 7→ “1a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ pBal [p]])
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted〉
Phase 1b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 1a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than the highest it
has seen, a sends a 1b message with m.bal and with the set of highest-numbered triples it has voted for each
slot, and it updates the highest ballot it has seen to be m.bal ; otherwise it sends a preempt message back with
the highest ballot it has seen.
Phase1b(a) , ∃m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1a” ∧
if m.bal > aBal [a] then
∧ Send([type 7→ “1b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , voted 7→ aVoted [a]])
∧ aBal ′ = [aBal except ! [a] = m.bal ]
∧ unchanged 〈pBal , aVoted〉
else
∧ Send([type 7→ “preempt”, to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]])
∧ unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted〉
Phase 2a: For a proposer p, if there is no 2a message with current ballot pBal [p], and a quorum of acceptors
has sent a set S of 1b messages with pBal [p], p sends a 2a message with pBal [p] and a set of proposals
PropSV (T ), where T is the union of all voted triples in messages in S . PropSV (T ) includes MaxSV (T ), the
set of slot-value pairs with the highest ballot for each slot in T , and NewSV (T ), a set of new slot-value pairs
for slots not in T .
MaxBSV (T ) , {t ∈ T : ∀ t2 ∈ T : t2.slot = t .slot ⇒ t2.bal ≤ t .bal}
MaxSV (T ) , {[slot 7→ t .slot , val 7→ t .val ] : t ∈ MaxBSV (T )}
UnusedS (T ) , {s ∈ S : ∄ t ∈ T : t .slot = s}
NewSV (T ) , choose D ⊆[slot :UnusedS (T ), val :V ] :∀ d1, d2 ∈ D :d1.slot =d2.slot ⇒d1=d2∧D 6= ∅
PropSV (T ) , MaxSV (T ) ∪ NewSV (T )
Phase2a(p) ,
∧ ∄m ∈ msgs : (m.type = “2a”) ∧ (m.bal = pBal [p])
∧ ∃Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1b” ∧m.bal = pBal [p]} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.from = a
∧ Send([type 7→ “2a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ pBal [p], propSV 7→ PropSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S})])
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted〉
Phase 2b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 2a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than or equal to the
highest it has seen, a sends a 2b message with m.bal and m.propSV , updates the highest ballot it has seen
to m.bal , and updates set of voted triples using m.propSV ; otherwise it sends a preempt message back with
the highest ballot it has seen.
Phase2b(a) , ∃m ∈ msgs : m.type = “2a” ∧
if m.bal ≥ aBal [a] then
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∧ Send([type 7→ “2b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , propSV 7→ m.propSV ])
∧ aBal ′ = [aBal except ! [a] = m.bal ]
∧ aVoted ′ = [aVoted except ! [a] = {[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV } ∪
{e ∈ aVoted [a] : ∄ r ∈ m.propSV : e.slot = r .slot}]
∧ unchanged 〈pBal〉
else
∧ Send([type 7→ “preempt”, to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]])
∧ unchanged 〈pBal , aBal , aVoted〉
Preempt: For a proposer p, if there is a preempt message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than p’s current
ballot, p updates its current ballot to a new ballot that is higher than m.bal and with which no 1a message
has been sent.
NewBal(b2) , choose b ∈ B : b > b2 ∧ ∄m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1a” ∧m.bal = b
Preempt(p) , ∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “preempt” ∧m.to = p ∧m.bal > pBal [p]
∧ pBal ′ = [pBal except ! [p] = NewBal(m.bal)]
∧unchanged 〈msgs , aBal , aVoted〉
Init , msgs = ∅ ∧ pBal = [p ∈ P 7→ 0] ∧ aBal = [a ∈ A 7→ − 1] ∧ aVoted = [a ∈ A 7→ ∅]
Next , ∨ ∃ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) ∨ Phase2a(p) ∨ Preempt(p)
∨ ∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ∨ Phase2b(a)
Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
26
B Safety property to prove for Multi-Paxos with Preemp-
tion and invariants used in proof
module MultiPaxosProp
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) means that acceptor a has sent some 2b message m with m.bal equal to b and some
proposal in m.propSV with slot equal to s and val equal to v . This specifies that acceptor a has voted the
triple 〈b, s , v〉.
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) , ∃m ∈ msgs :
m.type = “2b” ∧m.from = a ∧m.bal = b ∧ ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = s ∧ d .val = v
ChosenIn(b, s , v) means that every acceptor in some quorum Q has voted the triple 〈b, s , v〉.
ChosenIn(b, s , v) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)
Chosen(s , v) means that for some ballot b, ChosenIn(b, s , v) holds.
Chosen(s , v) , ∃ b ∈ B : ChosenIn(b, s , v)
WontVoteIn(a, b, s) means that acceptor a has seen a higher ballot than b, and did not and will not vote
any value with b for slot s .
WontVoteIn(a, b, s) , aBal [a] > b ∧ ∀ v ∈ V : ¬VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)
SafeAt(b, s , v) means that no value except perhaps v has been or will be chosen in any ballot lower than b
for slot s .
SafeAt(b, s , v) , ∀ b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1) : ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, b2, s , v) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b2, s)
Safe states that at most one value can be chosen for each slot.
Safe , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V , s ∈ S : Chosen(s , v1) ∧ Chosen(s , v2)⇒ v1 = v2
Messages defines the set of valid messages. TypeOK defines invariants for the types of the variables.
Messages , [type : {“1a”}, from : P , bal : B] ∪
[type : {“1b”}, from : A, bal : B, voted : subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]] ∪
[type : {“2a”}, from : P , bal : B, propSV : subset [slot : S, val : V ]] ∪
[type : {“2b”}, from : A, bal : B, propSV : subset [slot : S, val : V ]] ∪
[type : {“preempt”}, to : P , bal : B]
TypeOK , ∧msgs ⊆ Messages ∧ IsFiniteSet(msgs) ∧ pBal ∈ [P → B]
∧ aBal ∈ [A → B ∪ { − 1}] ∧ aVoted ∈ [A → subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]]
Max (T ) selects the largest element in nonempty set T .
Max (T ) , choose e ∈ T : ∀ f ∈ T : e ≥ f
MaxBalInSlot(T , s) selects, among set of elements in T with slot s , the highest ballot, or -1 if no element
has slot s .
MaxBalInSlot(T , s) , let E , {e ∈ T : e.slot = s} in if E = ∅ then − 1 else Max ({e.bal : e ∈ E})
MsgInv defines properties satisfied by the contents of messages, for 1b, 2a, and 2b messages.
MsgInv1b(m) , ∧m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from]
∧ ∀ r ∈ m.voted : VotedForIn(m.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1 . . m.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v)
MsgInv2a(m) , ∧ ∀ d ∈ m.propSV : SafeAt(m.bal , d .slot , d .val)
∧ ∀ d1, d2 ∈ m.propSV : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2
∧ ∀m2 ∈ msgs : (m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal)⇒ m2 = m
MsgInv2b(m) , ∧ ∃m2 ∈ msgs : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.propSV = m.propSV
∧m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from]
MsgInv , ∀m ∈ msgs : ∧ (m.type = “1b”)⇒ MsgInv1b(m)
∧ (m.type = “2a”) ⇒ MsgInv2a(m)
∧ (m.type = “2b”) ⇒ MsgInv2b(m)
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AccInv defines properties satisfied by the data maintained by the acceptors.
AccInv , ∀ a ∈ A :
∧ aBal [a] = − 1⇒ aVoted [a] = ∅
∧ ∀ r ∈ aVoted [a] : aBal [a] ≥ r .bal ∧ VotedForIn(a, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)⇒ ∃ r ∈ aVoted [a] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a], s)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)
Inv is the complete inductive invariant.
Inv , TypeOK ∧ AccInv ∧MsgInv
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C TLAPS checked proof of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
module MultiPaxosProof
The following 2 axioms and 10 lemmas are straightforward consequences of the predicates defined above.
axiom MaxInSet , ∀S ∈ (subset N) \ ∅ : Max (S ) ∈ S
axiom MaxOnNat , ∀S ∈ subset N : ∄ s ∈ S : Max (S ) < s
lemma MaxOnNatS , ∀S1, S2 ∈ (subset N) \ ∅ : S1 ⊆ S2⇒ Max (S1) ≤ Max (S2)by MaxInSet
lemma MaxBinSType , ∀S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], s ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∈ B ∪ { − 1}
by MaxInSet def MaxBalInSlot
lemma MaxBinSSubsets , ∀S1, S2 ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], s ∈ S : S1 ⊆ S2⇒
MaxBalInSlot(S1, s) ≤ MaxBalInSlot(S2, s)
〈1〉 suffices assume new S1 ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], new s ∈ S,
new S2 ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], S1 ⊆ S2
prove MaxBalInSlot(S1, s) ≤ MaxBalInSlot(S2, s) obvious
〈1〉1. case ∄ d ∈ S1 : d .slot = s
〈2〉1. MaxBalInSlot(S1, s) = − 1by 〈1〉1 def MaxBalInSlot
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉1, MaxBinSType def B
〈1〉2. case ∃ d ∈ S1 : d .slot = s
〈2〉1. case ∄ d ∈ S2 \ S1 : d .slot = s
〈3〉1. MaxBalInSlot(S1, s) = MaxBalInSlot(S2, s)by 〈2〉1, 〈1〉2 def MaxBalInSlot
〈3〉 qed by 〈3〉1, MaxBinSType def B
〈2〉2. case ∃ d ∈ S2 \ S1 : d .slot = s by 〈2〉2, 〈1〉2, MaxBinSType, MaxOnNatS def B, MaxBalInSlot
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2
lemma MaxBinSNoSlot , ∀S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], s ∈ S :
(∄ d ∈ S : d .slot = s) ≡ MaxBalInSlot(S , s) = − 1
by MaxInSet def MaxBalInSlot , B
lemma MaxBinSExists , ∀S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], s ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∈ B ⇒
∃ d ∈ S : d .slot = s ∧ d .bal = MaxBalInSlot(S , s)
〈1〉 suffices assume new S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ],
new s ∈ S, MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∈ B
prove ∃ d ∈ S : d .bal = MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∧ d .slot = s obvious
〈1〉1. ∃ d ∈ S : d .slot = s by def MaxBalInSlot , B
〈1〉2. MaxBalInSlot(S , s) = Max ({d .bal : d ∈ {d ∈ S : d .slot = s}})by 〈1〉1 def MaxBalInSlot
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, MaxInSet
lemma MaxBinSNoMore , ∀S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], s ∈ S :
∄ d ∈ S : d .bal > MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∧ d .slot = s
〈1〉 suffices assume new S ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ], new s ∈ S
prove ∄ d ∈ S : d .bal > MaxBalInSlot(S , s) ∧ d .slot = s obvious
〈1〉1. case ∄ d ∈ S : d .slot = s by 〈1〉1
〈1〉2. case ∃ d ∈ S : d .slot = s
〈2〉1. ∄ b ∈ {d .bal : d ∈ {d ∈ S : d .slot = s}} : b > MaxBalInSlot(S , s)
by 〈1〉2, MaxOnNat def MaxBalInSlot , B, S
〈2〉2. ∄ d ∈ S : (d .slot = s ∧ ¬(d .bal ≤ MaxBalInSlot(S , s))) by 〈2〉1
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉2
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2
lemma Misc , ∀S : ∧ NewSV (S ) ∈ (subset [slot : UnusedS (S ), val : V ]) \ ∅
∧ ∀ t1, t2 ∈ NewSV (S ) : t1.slot = t2.slot ⇒ t1 = t2
∧ ∄ t1 ∈ MaxSV (S ), t2 ∈ NewSV (S ) : t1.slot = t2.slot
〈1〉 suffices assume new S
prove ∧NewSV (S ) ∈ (subset [slot : UnusedS (S ), val : V ]) \ ∅
∧ ∀ t1, t2 ∈ NewSV (S ) : t1.slot = t2.slot ⇒ t1 = t2
∧ ∄ t1 ∈ MaxSV (S ), t2 ∈ NewSV (S ) : t1.slot = t2.slot obvious
〈1〉1. ∃T ∈ (subset [slot : UnusedS (S ), val : V ]) \ ∅ : ∀ t1, t2 ∈ T : t1.slot = t2.slot ⇒ t1 = t2
by def UnusedS
〈1〉2. NewSV (S ) ∈ (subset [slot : UnusedS (S ), val : V ]) \ ∅by 〈1〉1 def NewSV
〈1〉3. ∀ t1, t2 ∈ NewSV (S ) : t1.slot = t2.slot ⇒ t1 = t2by 〈1〉1 def NewSV
〈1〉4. ∄ t1 ∈ MaxSV (S ), t2 ∈ ([slot : UnusedS (S ), val : V ] \ ∅) : t1.slot = t2.slot
by def MaxSV , MaxBSV , UnusedS
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4
VotedInv asserts that if any acceptor a voted any triple 〈b, s , v〉, then that triple is safe.
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lemma VotedInv , MsgInv ∧ TypeOK ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)⇒ SafeAt(b, s , v) ∧ b ≤ aBal [a]
by def VotedForIn, MsgInv , Messages , TypeOK , MsgInv2a, MsgInv1b, MsgInv2b
VotedOnce asserts that if any acceptor a1 voted triple 〈b, s , v1〉 and acceptor a2 voted triple 〈b, s , v2〉, then
v1 = v2.
lemma VotedOnce , MsgInv ⇒ ∀ a1, a2 ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v1, v2 ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a1, b, s , v1) ∧ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v2)⇒ (v1 = v2)
by def MsgInv , VotedForIn, MsgInv2a, MsgInv1b, MsgInv2b
VotedUnion asserts that, in any two 1b messages’ voted field, triples with the same ballot and slot have the
same value.
lemma VotedUnion , MsgInv ∧TypeOK ⇒ ∀m1, m2 ∈ msgs : m1.type = “1b” ∧m2.type = “1b” ⇒
∀ d1 ∈ m1.voted , d2 ∈ m2.voted : (d1.bal = d2.bal ∧ d1.slot = d2.slot)⇒
d1.val = d2.val
〈1〉 suffices assume MsgInv , TypeOK , new m1 ∈ msgs , new m2 ∈ msgs , m1.type = “1b”, m2.type = “1b”,
new d1 ∈ m1.voted , new d2 ∈ m2.voted , d1.bal = d2.bal , d1.slot = d2.slot
prove d1.val = d2.val obvious
〈1〉1. VotedForIn(m1.from, d1.bal , d1.slot , d1.val)by def MsgInv , MsgInv1b
〈1〉2. VotedForIn(m2.from, d2.bal , d2.slot , d2.val)by def MsgInv , MsgInv1b
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, VotedOnce def TypeOK , Messages
The following 5 invariance lemmas assert that, for acceptor a, ballot b, slot s , and value v , and for all phases
and preempt, if VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) holds then VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)′ holds; for all except Phase2b, the
inverse also holds.
lemma Phase1aVotedForInv , TypeOK ⇒ ∀ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)′
by def VotedForIn, Send , TypeOK , Messages , Phase1a
lemma Phase1bVotedForInv , TypeOK ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ⇒ ∀ a2 ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)′
by def VotedForIn, Send , TypeOK , Messages , Phase1b
lemma Phase2aVotedForInv , TypeOK ⇒ ∀ p ∈ P : Phase2a(p) ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)′
by ∀ p ∈ P : Phase2a(p) ⇒ ∀m ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : m.type = “2a” def VotedForIn,
Send , TypeOK , Messages , Phase2a
lemma Phase2bVotedForInv , TypeOK ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A : Phase2b(a) ⇒ ∀ a2 ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)⇒ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)′
by def VotedForIn, Send , TypeOK , Messages , Phase2b
lemma PreemptVotedForInv , TypeOK ⇒ ∀ p ∈ P : Preempt(p)⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)′
by def VotedForIn, Send , TypeOK , Messages , Preempt
Invariance lemma SafeAtStable asserts that if SafeAt(b, s , v) holds then SafeAt(b, s , v)′ holds in the next
state.
lemma SafeAtStable , Inv ∧ Next ∧TypeOK ′ ⇒ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : SafeAt(b, s , v)⇒ SafeAt(b, s , v)′
〈1〉 suffices assume Inv , Next , TypeOK ′, new b ∈ B, new s ∈ S, new v ∈ V , SafeAt(b, s , v)
prove SafeAt(b, s , v)′ obvious
〈1〉 use def Send , Inv , B
〈1〉1. case ∃ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) by 〈1〉1 def SafeAt , Phase1a, VotedForIn, WontVoteIn
〈1〉2. case ∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a)
by 〈1〉2, QuorumAssumption def TypeOK , SafeAt , WontVoteIn, VotedForIn, Phase1b
〈1〉3. assume new p ∈ P , Phase2a(p) prove SafeAt(b, s , v)′
〈2〉1. ∀ a ∈ A, b2 ∈ B, s2 ∈ S : WontVoteIn(a, b2, s2) ≡ WontVoteIn(a, b2, s2)′
by 〈1〉3, Phase2aVotedForInv def WontVoteIn, Send , Phase2a
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉1, QuorumAssumption, Phase2aVotedForInv , 〈1〉3 def SafeAt
〈1〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove SafeAt(b, s , v)′
〈2〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Phase2b(a)!(m)by 〈1〉4 def Phase2b
〈2〉2. ∀ a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B : aBal [a2] > b2⇒ aBal ′[a2] > b2by 〈2〉1 def TypeOK
〈2〉3. assume new a2 ∈ A, new b2 ∈ B, new s2 ∈ S, new v2 ∈ V , WontVoteIn(a2, b2, s2),
VotedForIn(a2, b2, s2, v2)′, new S ∈ subset [slot : S \ {s2}, val : V ]
prove false
〈3〉1. ∃m1 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : ∧m1.type = “2b” ∧m1.bal = b2 ∧m1.from = a2
∧ ∃ d ∈ m1.propSV : d .slot = s2 ∧ d .val = v2
by 〈2〉3 def VotedForIn, WontVoteIn
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〈3〉2. a2 = a ∧m.bal = b2by 〈2〉1, 〈3〉1 def TypeOK
〈3〉 qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉3, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉1 def Phase2b, WontVoteIn, TypeOK
〈2〉4. ∀ a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B, s2 ∈ S : WontVoteIn(a2, b2, s2)⇒ WontVoteIn(a2, b2, s2)′
by 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3 def WontVoteIn
〈2〉 qed by Phase2bVotedForInv , 〈2〉4, QuorumAssumption, 〈1〉4 def SafeAt
〈1〉5. case ∃ p ∈ P : Preempt(p)by 〈1〉5 def SafeAt , Preempt , VotedForIn, WontVoteIn
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4, 〈1〉5 def Next
Invariant asserts the temporal formula that if Spec holds then Inv always holds.
theorem Invariant , Spec ⇒ ✷Inv
〈1〉 use def B, S
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ Inv by FS EmptySet def Init , Inv , TypeOK , AccInv , MsgInv , VotedForIn
〈1〉2. Inv ∧ [Next ]vars ⇒ Inv ′
〈2〉 suffices assume Inv , [Next ]varsprove Inv ′ obvious
〈2〉 use def Inv
〈2〉1. case Next
〈3〉1 proves TypeOK ′ for Next . Each of 〈4〉1-4 assumes the action of a phase and proves TypeOK ′ for that
case.
〈3〉1. TypeOK ′
〈4〉1. assume new p ∈ P , Phase1a(p) prove TypeOK ′
by 〈4〉1, msgs ′ \msgs ⊆ Messages , FS AddElement def Phase1a, TypeOK , Send , Messages
〈4〉2. assume new p ∈ P , Phase2a(p) prove TypeOK ′
〈5〉1. pick Q ∈ Q, S ∈ subset {m ∈ msgs : (m.type = “1b”) ∧ (m.bal = pBal [p])} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.from = a
∧ Send([type 7→ “2a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ pBal [p],
propSV 7→ PropSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S})])by 〈4〉2 def Phase2a
〈5〉2. UnusedS (union {m.voted : m ∈ S}) ⊆ S by 〈5〉1 def UnusedS , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉3. MaxBSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S}) ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]
by def MaxBSV , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉4. ∧ NewSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S}) ⊆ [slot : S, val : V ]
∧MaxSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S}) ⊆ [slot : S, val : V ]by 〈5〉3, 〈5〉2, Misc def MaxSV
〈5〉5. PropSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S}) ⊆ [slot : S, val : V ]by 〈5〉4 def PropSV
〈5〉6. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : ∧m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.from = p ∧m2.bal = pBal [p]
∧m2.propSV = PropSV (union {m.voted : m ∈ S})
by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉5 def Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉7. (msgs ⊆ Messages)′ by 〈4〉2, 〈5〉6, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉5, msgs ′ \msgs ⊆ Messages def Phase2a,
TypeOK , Send , Messages
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉7, 〈4〉2, FS AddElement def Phase2a, TypeOK , Send
〈4〉3. assume new a ∈ A, Phase1b(a) prove TypeOK ′
〈5〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Phase1b(a)!(m) by 〈4〉3 def Phase1b
〈5〉2. ∨msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type 7→ “1b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , voted 7→ aVoted [a]]}
∨msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type 7→ “preempt”, to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]]} by 〈5〉1 def Send
〈5〉3. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : ∨m2.type = “1b” ∧m2.from = a ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.voted = aVoted [a]
∨m2.type = “preempt” ∧m2.to = m.from ∧m2.bal = aBal [a]
by 〈5〉1 def Send
〈5〉4. (msgs ⊆ Messages)′ by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3 def TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈5〉5. IsFiniteSet(msgs)′ by 〈5〉2, FS AddElement def TypeOK
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉4, 〈5〉5, 〈4〉3 def Phase1b, TypeOK
〈4〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove TypeOK ′
〈5〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Phase2b(a)!(m) by 〈4〉4 def Phase2b
〈5〉2. ∨msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type 7→ “2b”, bal 7→ m.bal , from 7→ a, propSV 7→ m.propSV ]}
∨msgs ′ = msgs ∪ {[type 7→ “preempt”, to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]]} by 〈5〉1 def Send
〈5〉3. IsFiniteSet(msgs)′ by 〈5〉2, FS AddElement def TypeOK
〈5〉4. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : ∨m2.type = “2b” ∧m2.from = a ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.propSV = m.propSV
∨m2.type = “preempt” ∧m2.to = m.from ∧m2.bal = aBal [a]
by 〈5〉1 def Send
〈5〉5. (msgs ⊆ Messages)′ by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉4 def TypeOK , Send , Messages
〈5〉6. ∨ aVoted = aVoted ′
∨ ∧domain aVoted = domain aVoted ′
∧ aVoted ′[a] = {d ∈ aVoted [a] : ∄ d2 ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = d2.slot} ∪
{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV }
∧ ∀ a2 ∈ A\ {a} : aVoted [a2] = aVoted ′[a2]by 〈5〉1 def TypeOK
〈5〉7. (aVoted ∈ [A → subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]])′ by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉6,
{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV } ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ],
{d ∈ aVoted [a] : ∄ d2 ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = d2.slot} ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ],
aVoted ′[a] ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ] def TypeOK , Messages
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〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉5, 〈5〉7, 〈4〉4, 〈5〉3 def Phase2b, TypeOK
〈4〉5 proves TypeOK ′ for Preempt . This is the new part of the remedial proof described in Section 5.1.
〈4〉5. assume new p ∈ P , Preempt(p) prove TypeOK ′
〈5〉 define S , {m1 ∈ msgs : m1.type = “1a”}T , {s .bal : s ∈ S} f , [s ∈ S 7→ s .bal ]
〈5〉 hide def S , T , f
〈5〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Preempt(p)!(m)by 〈4〉5 def Preempt
〈5〉2. T ⊆ B by def T , S , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉3. ∃ b ∈ B : b > m.bal ∧ b /∈ T
by 〈5〉2, MaxInSet , Max (T ∪ {m.bal}) + 1 > m.bal , 〈5〉1 def Max , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉4. NewBal(m.bal) ∈ B by 〈5〉3 def NewBal , TypeOK , Messages , T , S
〈5〉5. (pBal ∈ [P → B])′ by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉4 def TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉 qed by 〈4〉5, 〈5〉5 def Preempt , TypeOK
〈4〉 qed by 〈2〉1, 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈4〉5 def Next
〈3〉2 proves AccInv ′ for Next . Each of 〈4〉1-4 assumes the action of a phase and proves AccInv ′ for that case.
Only Phase2b is challenging because only it updates acceptor variables.
〈3〉2. AccInv ′
〈4〉1. case ∃ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) by 〈4〉1, 〈3〉1, Phase1aVotedForInv def AccInv , TypeOK , Phase1a, Send
〈4〉2. assume new p ∈ P , Phase2a(p) prove AccInv ′
〈5〉1. ∀ a ∈ A, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a, b, s , v)′
by 〈4〉2, Phase2aVotedForInv
〈5〉 qed by 〈3〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈5〉1 def AccInv , TypeOK , Phase2a, Send , Messages
〈4〉3. case ∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) by 〈4〉3, 〈3〉1, Phase1bVotedForInv def AccInv , TypeOK , Phase1b, Send
〈4〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove AccInv ′
〈5〉 suffices assume new a2 ∈ A′
prove ( ∧ aBal [a2] = − 1⇒ aVoted [a2] = ∅
∧ ∀ r ∈ aVoted [a2] : VotedForIn(a2, r .bal , r .slot , r .val) ∧ r .bal ≤ aBal [a2]
∧ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
∧ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)⇒ ∃ r ∈ aVoted [a2] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s
∧ b > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a2], s)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v))′
by def AccInv
〈5〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Phase2b(a)!(m) by 〈4〉4 def Phase2b
〈5〉2 assumes that a received a 2a message with a ballot lower than the highest it has seen, thus triggering
preemption. This case is simple as acceptor variables are unchanged.
〈5〉2. case (a2 = a ∧ ¬(m.bal ≥ aBal [a])) ∨ a2 6= a
〈6〉1. ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v) ≡ VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)′
by 〈3〉1, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2 def Phase2b, TypeOK , B, Messages , VotedForIn, Send
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2, 〈4〉4, 〈3〉1 def Phase2b, Send , AccInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉3 assumes that a received a 2a message with a ballot higher than or equal to the highest it has seen.
Thus, it responds with a 2bmessage and updates its variables as specified. Each of 〈6〉1-4 proves a conjunct
of AccInv .
〈5〉3. case a2 = a ∧ (m.bal ≥ aBal [a])
〈6〉1. (aBal [a2] = − 1⇒ aVoted [a2] = ∅)′ by 〈5〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈3〉1 def AccInv , Phase2b, Send ,
TypeOK , Messages
〈6〉2. (∀ r ∈ aVoted [a2] : VotedForIn(a2, r .bal , r .slot , r .val) ∧ r .bal ≤ aBal [a2])′
〈7〉 suffices assume new r ∈ (aVoted [a2])′
prove (VotedForIn(a2, r .bal , r .slot , r .val) ∧ r .bal ≤ aBal [a2])′ obvious
〈7〉1 uses two cases. 〈8〉1 is for r ∈ aVoted [a2] and uses invariance lemma for Phase2b. 〈8〉2 is for the
increment r ∈ aVoted ′[a2] \ aVoted [a2] and uses definition of Phase2b.
〈7〉1. VotedForIn(a2, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)′
〈8〉1. case r ∈ aVoted [a2]
〈9〉1. VotedForIn(a2, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)by 〈5〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈8〉1 def AccInv
〈9〉 qed by 〈9〉1, Phase2bVotedForInv , 〈3〉1, 〈4〉4 def TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉2. case r ∈ aVoted ′[a2] \ aVoted [a2]
〈9〉1. ∃m2 ∈ msgs ′ : m2.type = “2b” ∧m2.from = a2 ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.propSV = m.propSV
by 〈3〉1, 〈8〉2, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3 def Send
〈9〉2. r .bal = m.bal ∧ ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : r .slot = d .slot ∧ r .val = d .val by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3, 〈3〉1, 〈8〉2
〈9〉 qed by 〈9〉1, 〈9〉2 def Send , TypeOK , Messages , VotedForIn
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉1, 〈8〉2
〈7〉2. (r .bal ≤ aBal [a2])′ by 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3, 〈3〉1, aBal [a] ≤ aBal ′[a], r ∈ aVoted [a]⇒ r .bal ≤ aBal ′[a],
aVoted ′[a] = {d ∈ aVoted [a] : ∄ d2 ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = d2.slot} ∪
{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV },
r ∈ aVoted ′[a2] \ aVoted [a2]⇒ r .bal = m.bal
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def AccInv , Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2
〈6〉3. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)⇒ ∃ r ∈ aVoted [a2] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s)′
〈7〉 suffices assume new b ∈ B′, new s ∈ S ′, new v ∈ V ′, VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)′
prove (∃ r ∈ aVoted [a2] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s)′ obvious
〈7〉1. case VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)
〈8〉1. pick r ∈ aVoted [a2] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s by 〈7〉1 def AccInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉2. m.bal ≥ b by 〈8〉1, 〈5〉3 def TypeOK , Messages , AccInv
〈8〉3. case ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = s
〈9〉1. ∃ r2 ∈ aVoted ′[a] : r2.bal = m.bal ∧ r2.slot = sby 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3,
aVoted ′[a] = {d ∈ aVoted [a] : ∄ d2 ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = d2.slot} ∪
{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.propSV }, 〈8〉3 def TypeOK
〈9〉 qed by 〈9〉1, 〈5〉3, 〈8〉2
〈8〉4. case ∄ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = s by 〈8〉4, 〈8〉1, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉3, r ∈ aVoted ′[a2]
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉3, 〈8〉4
〈7〉2. case ¬VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v)
〈8〉1. ∃ d ∈ m.propSV : d .slot = s by 〈5〉1, 〈7〉2 def Send , TypeOK , Messages , VotedForIn
〈8〉2. ∃ r ∈ aVoted ′[a2] : r .bal = m.bal ∧ r .slot = s by 〈5〉1, 〈8〉1, 〈2〉1, 〈5〉3 def Send , TypeOK ,
Messages
〈8〉3. b = m.bal by 〈5〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈5〉3 def VotedForIn, Send
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉2, 〈8〉3
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2
〈6〉4. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a2], s)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v))′
〈7〉 suffices assume new b ∈ B′, new s ∈ S ′, new v ∈ V ′, (VotedForIn(a2, b, s , v))′,
(b > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a2], s))′
prove false obvious
〈7〉1. ∄ d ∈ aVoted ′[a2] : d .slot = s ∧ d .bal > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a2], s)′
by MaxBinSNoMore, 〈3〉1 def TypeOK
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1, 〈6〉3, ∃ r ∈ aVoted ′[a2] : r .bal ≥ b ∧ r .slot = s , MaxBinSType, 〈3〉1 def Send ,
TypeOK , Messages
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈6〉3, 〈6〉4
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉2, 〈5〉3
〈4〉5. case ∃ p ∈ P : Preempt(p)
〈5〉1. ∀ a ∈ A, s ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a], s) = MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a], s)′
by 〈3〉1, 〈4〉5 def Preempt , MaxBalInSlot
〈5〉 qed by 〈4〉5, 〈3〉1, PreemptVotedForInv , 〈5〉1 def AccInv , TypeOK , Preempt , Send
〈4〉.qed by 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈4〉5, 〈2〉1 def Next
〈3〉3 proves MsgInv ′ for Next . Each of 〈4〉1-4 assumes the action of a phase and proves MsgInv ′ for that
case.
〈3〉3. MsgInv ′
〈4〉1. case ∃ p ∈ P : Phase1a(p) by 〈4〉1, Phase1aVotedForInv , 〈3〉1, SafeAtStable, 〈2〉1
def Phase1a, MsgInv , Send , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, MsgInv2b
〈4〉2 proves MsgInv ′ for Phase1b. 〈5〉13,14 conclude the proof while 〈5〉1-12 prove intermediate facts. Each
of 〈5〉2,4,12 proves a conjunct of MsgInv1b for the increment m1—the new 1b message sent in Phase1b(a).
〈4〉2. assume new a ∈ A, Phase1b(a) prove MsgInv ′
〈5〉 define m1 , [type 7→ “1b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , voted 7→ aVoted [a]]
〈5〉1. pick m ∈ msgs : Phase1b(a)!(m) by 〈4〉2 def Phase1b
〈5〉2. (m1.bal ≤ aBal [m1.from])′ by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1 def Phase1b, Send , TypeOK , MsgInv , Messages
〈5〉3. m1.voted = aVoted [m1.from]by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1 def Phase1b, Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉4. (∀ r ∈ m1.voted : VotedForIn(m1.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val))′
by 〈5〉1, 〈4〉2, Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈3〉1, 〈5〉3 def TypeOK , Messages , AccInv
〈5〉5. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(m1.from, b, s , v))′
by Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈4〉2, 〈5〉3, 〈5〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉1 def AccInv , MsgInv , Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉6. ∀ s ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) ∈ B ∪ { − 1}by 〈3〉1, MaxBinSType def TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉7. ∀ s ∈ S : ∧MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 ∈ B
∧MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s)
〈6〉 suffices assume new s ∈ S
prove ∧MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s)
∧MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 ∈ B obvious
〈6〉1. case MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) = − 1by 〈6〉1
〈6〉2. case MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) ∈ B by ∀ x ∈ B : x + 1 > x , 〈6〉2
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈5〉6
〈5〉9. m1.bal ∈ B by 〈3〉1 def TypeOK , Messages
〈5〉10. ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1⇒ b > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s)
〈6〉 suffices assume new b ∈ B, new s ∈ S, b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1
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prove b > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) obvious
〈6〉 hide def m1
〈6〉 define x , MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) y , m1.bal − 1
〈6〉1. x ∈ B ∪ { − 1}by 〈5〉6
〈6〉2. y ∈ B ∪ { − 1}by 〈5〉9
〈6〉 hide def x , y
〈6〉3. case x + 1 > y
〈7〉1. ∀ e ∈ B : e /∈ x + 1 . . y by 〈6〉3, 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈7〉 qed by 〈6〉3, 〈7〉1 def x , y
〈6〉4. case x + 1 = y by 〈6〉4, 〈5〉7, 〈3〉1, 〈5〉9 def x , y
〈6〉5. case x + 1 < y
〈7〉1. ∀ e ∈ B : e ∈ x + 1 . . y ⇒ e > x by 〈6〉5, 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈7〉2. b ∈ x + 1 . . y by def x , y
〈7〉3. b > x by 〈7〉2, 〈7〉1
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉3 def x
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉3, 〈6〉4, 〈6〉5, 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈5〉11. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1⇒
b > MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s))′ by 〈5〉10, 〈5〉1
〈5〉12. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m1.from, b, s , v))′
〈6〉 suffices assume new b ∈ B′, new s ∈ S ′, new v ∈ V ′
prove (b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m1.from, b, s , v))′ obvious
〈6〉1. case ∄ x ∈ B : x ∈ (MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1)′ by 〈6〉1
〈6〉2. case ∃ x ∈ B : x ∈ (MaxBalInSlot(m1.voted , s) + 1 . . m1.bal − 1)′ by 〈6〉2, 〈5〉5, 〈5〉11
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈5〉13 is for 1a message m having a higher ballot than the highest seen, thus generating a 1b message.
〈5〉13. case m.bal > aBal [a]
〈6〉 suffices assume new m2 ∈ msgs ′
prove ( ∧ (m2.type = “1b”)⇒ MsgInv1b(m2) ∧ (m2.type = “2a”) ⇒ MsgInv2a(m2)
∧ (m2.type = “2b”)⇒ MsgInv2b(m2))′ by def MsgInv
Proves MsgInv1b using two cases. 〈7〉1 is for m2 ∈ msgs . 〈7〉2 is for the increment m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs .
〈6〉1. (m2.type = “1b” ⇒ MsgInv1b(m2))′
〈7〉1. case m2 ∈ msgs by 〈7〉1, 〈5〉13, 〈5〉1, Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈4〉2 def MsgInv , MsgInv1b,
TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉2. case m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs
〈8〉1. m2 = m1by 〈5〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈5〉13 def Send
〈8〉 qed by 〈7〉2, 〈5〉13, Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈4〉2, 〈5〉2, 〈5〉4, 〈5〉12, 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1, 〈2〉1,
〈8〉1 def Send , TypeOK , MsgInv , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2
Proves MsgInv2a and MsgInv2b using invariance lemma for Phase1b because it does not send 2a or 2b
messages.
〈6〉2. ((m2.type = “2a” ⇒ MsgInv2a(m2)) ∧ (m2.type = “2b” ⇒ MsgInv2b(m2)))′
by 〈5〉13, Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈5〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈3〉1, SafeAtStable, 〈2〉1 def Send , TypeOK ,
MsgInv , Messages , MsgInv2a, MsgInv2b
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈5〉14 is the simple case of preemption and uses the invariance lemmas for Phase1b and SafeAt .
〈5〉14. case ¬(m.bal > aBal [a])by 〈5〉14, Phase1bVotedForInv , 〈4〉2, 〈5〉2, 〈5〉4, 〈5〉12, 〈5〉1,
SafeAtStable, 〈3〉1, 〈2〉1 def Send , TypeOK , MsgInv , Messages , MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, MsgInv2b
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉13, 〈5〉14
〈4〉3 proves MsgInv ′ for Phase2a. Each of 〈5〉4-6 proves a conjunct of MsgInv .
〈4〉3. assume new p ∈ P , Phase2a(p) prove MsgInv ′
〈5〉 suffices assume new m ∈ msgs ′
prove ( ∧ (m.type = “1b” ⇒ MsgInv1b(m)) ∧ (m.type = “2a” ⇒ MsgInv2a(m))
∧ (m.type = “2b” ⇒ MsgInv2b(m)))′ by def MsgInv
〈5〉 define b , pBal [p]
〈5〉1. pick Q ∈ Q, S ∈ subset {m2 ∈ msgs : (m2.type = “1b”) ∧ (m2.bal = b)} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m2 ∈ S : m2.from = a
∧ Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, from 7→ p, propSV 7→ PropSV (union {m2.voted : m2 ∈ S})])
by 〈4〉3 def Phase2a
〈5〉2. b = pBal ′[p] ∧ b ∈ B by 〈4〉3 def Phase2a, TypeOK
〈5〉3. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = b by 〈5〉1 def Send
〈5〉4 proves MsgInv1b′. It uses invariance lemma for Phase2a, because Phase2a does not send 1b messages.
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〈5〉4. (m.type = “1b” ⇒ MsgInv1b(m))′
〈6〉 suffices assume (m.type = “1b”)′ prove MsgInv1b(m)′ obvious
〈6〉1. (m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from])′ by 〈4〉3, 〈5〉3, 〈3〉1, Phase2aVotedForInv def TypeOK , Messages ,
MsgInv , Phase2a, MsgInv1b
〈6〉2. (∀ r ∈ m.voted : VotedForIn(m.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val))′ by 〈4〉3, 〈5〉3, 〈3〉1,
Phase2aVotedForInv def TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv , MsgInv1b
〈6〉3. ∀ s ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) = MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s)′ by def MaxBalInSlot
〈6〉4. (∀ b2 ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b2 ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1 . . m.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m.from, b2, s , v))′
by 〈4〉3, 〈5〉3, 〈3〉1, Phase2aVotedForInv , 〈6〉3 def TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv , MsgInv1b
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈6〉4 def MsgInv1b
〈5〉5 proves MsgInv2a′. Each of 〈6〉2-4 proves a conjunct of MsgInv2a using the increment approach. The
increment is m2 in 〈8〉2 of 〈7〉9.
〈5〉5. (m.type = “2a” ⇒ MsgInv2a(m))′
〈6〉 suffices assume (m.type = “2a”)′ prove MsgInv2a(m)′ obvious
〈6〉 define VS , union {m2.voted : m2 ∈ S}
〈6〉1. ∀ a ∈ Q : aBal [a] ≥ b by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉1 def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈6〉2. (∀ d ∈ m.propSV : SafeAt(m.bal , d .slot , d .val))′
〈7〉1. ∀ d ∈ [slot : UnusedS (VS ), val : V ] \ ∅ : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)
〈8〉 suffices assume new d ∈ [slot : UnusedS (VS ), val : V ] \ ∅prove SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)
obvious
〈8〉1. ∀m2 ∈ S : ∄ d2 ∈ m2.voted : d .slot = d2.slot by def UnusedS
〈8〉2. ∀m2 ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(m2.voted , d .slot) + 1 = 0by 〈8〉1 def MaxBalInSlot
〈8〉3. ∀m2 ∈ S , b2 ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b2 ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m2.voted , s) + 1 . . m2.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m2.from, b2, s , v)by def MsgInv , MsgInv1b
〈8〉4. ∀ v ∈ V , b2 ∈ B, a ∈ Q : b2 ∈ 0 . . b − 1⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a, b2, d .slot , v)
by 〈5〉1, 〈8〉2, 〈8〉3 def UnusedS , TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉4, 〈3〉1, 〈6〉1 def SafeAt , NewSV , UnusedS , WontVoteIn, TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉2. ∀ d ∈ [slot : UnusedS (VS ), val : V ] \ ∅ : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉1, SafeAtStable,
〈3〉1, 〈2〉1, 〈5〉2 def NewSV , UnusedS , TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉3. ∀ d ∈ NewSV (VS ) : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉2, Misc def NewSV
〈7〉4. ∀ d ∈ MaxBSV (VS ) : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)
〈8〉 suffices assume new d ∈ MaxBSV (VS ), new b2 ∈ B, b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1)
prove ∃Q2 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q2 : ∨ VotedForIn(a, b2, d .slot , d .val)
∨WontVoteIn(a, b2, d .slot) by def SafeAt
〈8〉 define max , MaxBalInSlot(VS , d .slot)
〈8〉 use def MaxBSV
〈8〉1. max ∈ B by MaxBinSType, MaxBinSNoSlot def TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉2. ∀m2 ∈ S : MaxBalInSlot(m2.voted , d .slot) ≤ max
by ∀m2 ∈ S : m2.voted ⊆ VS , MaxBinSSubsets def MaxBSV , TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉3. ∄ d2 ∈ VS : (d2.bal > d .bal ∧ d2.slot = d .slot)
by ∀ d2 ∈ VS : ¬(¬(d2.bal ≤ d .bal) ∧ d2.slot = d .slot) def MaxBSV , TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉4. VS ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]by 〈3〉1 def TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉5. max = d .bal
〈9〉 suffices assume max 6= d .bal prove false obvious
〈9〉1. case max > d .bal
〈10〉 hide def VS
〈10〉1. ∃ d2 ∈ VS : d2.bal = max ∧ d2.slot = d .slot by 〈8〉4, 〈8〉1, MaxBinSExists
〈10〉 qed by 〈10〉1, 〈8〉3, 〈9〉1
〈9〉2. case max < d .bal by MaxBinSNoMore, 〈9〉2 def MaxBSV , TypeOK , Messages
〈9〉 qed by 〈9〉1, 〈9〉2, 〈8〉1 def B, TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉6. case b2 ∈ max + 1 . . b − 1
〈9〉 hide def max
〈9〉1. ∀m2 ∈ S , b3 ∈ B, v ∈ V : b3 ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m2.voted , d .slot) + 1 . . b − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m2.from, b3, d .slot , v)
by def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈9〉2. ∀m2 ∈ S , v ∈ V : ¬VotedForIn(m2.from, b2, d .slot , v)
by 〈8〉6, 〈9〉1, 〈8〉2, 〈8〉1, MaxBinSType def TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈9〉 qed by 〈5〉1, 〈8〉6, 〈6〉1, 〈9〉2 def MsgInv , MsgInv1b, TypeOK , Messages , WontVoteIn,
MaxBSV
〈8〉7. case b2 = max
〈9〉1. ∃ a ∈ A, m2 ∈ S : m2.from = a ∧ ∃ d2 ∈ m2.voted :
d2.bal = d .bal ∧ d2.slot = d .slot ∧ d2.val = d .val
by def MaxBalInSlot , TypeOK , Messages
〈9〉2. ∃ a ∈ A : VotedForIn(a, b2, d .slot , d .val)
by 〈8〉7, 〈9〉1, 〈8〉5 def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈9〉3. ∀ q ∈ Q , v2 ∈ V : VotedForIn(q, b2, d .slot , v2)⇒ v2 = d .val
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by 〈9〉2, VotedOnce, QuorumAssumption def TypeOK , Messages
〈9〉4. ∀ q ∈ Q : aBal [q] > b2by 〈5〉1 def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈9〉 qed by 〈8〉7, 〈9〉3, 〈9〉4 def WontVoteIn
〈8〉8. case b2 ∈ 0 . . max − 1
〈9〉1. ∃ a ∈ A : VotedForIn(a, d .bal , d .slot , d .val)
by 〈8〉8, 〈8〉2 def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈9〉2. SafeAt(d .bal , d .slot , d .val)by 〈9〉1, VotedInv def TypeOK , Messages
〈9〉 qed by 〈8〉8, 〈9〉2, 〈8〉5 def SafeAt , MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MaxBalInSlot
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉6, 〈8〉7, 〈8〉8, 〈8〉1
〈7〉5. MaxBSV (VS ) ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]by def MaxBSV , TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉6. ∀ d ∈ MaxBSV (VS ) : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉4, SafeAtStable, 〈3〉1, 〈7〉5, 〈2〉1, 〈5〉2
〈7〉7. ∀ d ∈ MaxSV (VS ) : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉6, 〈7〉5 def MaxSV
〈7〉8. ∀ d ∈ MaxSV (VS ) ∪ NewSV (VS ) : SafeAt(b, d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉7, 〈7〉3
〈7〉9. (∀m2 ∈ msgs : m2.type = “2a” ⇒ ∀ d ∈ m2.propSV : SafeAt(m2.bal , d .slot , d .val))′
〈8〉 suffices assume new m2 ∈ msgs ′, (m2.type = “2a”)′, new d ∈ m2.propSV
prove (SafeAt(m2.bal , d .slot , d .val))′ obvious
〈8〉1. case m2 ∈ msgs by 〈3〉1, SafeAtStable, 〈8〉1, 〈2〉1 def MsgInv , MsgInv2a, Messages , TypeOK
〈8〉2. case m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs
〈9〉1. SafeAt(m2.bal , d .slot , d .val)′ by 〈7〉8, 〈8〉2, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2 def Send , PropSV
〈9〉 qed by 〈3〉1, 〈9〉1 def Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉1, 〈8〉2
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉9
The increment is m2 in 〈7〉1.
〈6〉3. (∀ d1, d2 ∈ m.propSV : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2)′
〈7〉1. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : ∀ d1, d2 ∈ m2.propSV : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2
〈8〉1. VS ∈ subset [bal : B, slot : S, val : V ]by def Messages , TypeOK
〈8〉2. ∀ r1, r2 ∈ MaxBSV (VS ) : r1.slot = r2.slot ⇒ r1.bal = r2.bal by 〈8〉1 def MaxBSV
〈8〉3. MaxBSV (VS ) ⊆ VS by 〈8〉1 def MaxBSV
〈8〉4. ∀ r1, r2 ∈ MaxBSV (VS ) : r1.bal = r2.bal ∧ r1.slot = r2.slot ⇒ r1.val = r2.val
by 〈8〉3, VotedUnion
〈8〉5. ∀ r1, r2 ∈ MaxBSV (VS ) : r1.slot = r2.slot ⇒ r1.bal = r2.bal ∧ r1.val = r2.val
by 〈8〉4, 〈8〉2, 〈8〉3, 〈8〉1
〈8〉6. ∀ r1, r2 ∈ MaxSV (VS ) : r1.slot = r2.slot ⇒ r1 = r2by 〈8〉5 def MaxSV
〈8〉 qed by 〈8〉6, Misc, 〈5〉1 def PropSV , Send
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1 def MsgInv , MsgInv2a
The increment is m1,m2 in 〈7〉2.
〈6〉4. (∀m2 ∈ msgs : (m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal)⇒ (m2 = m))′
〈7〉1. ∀m2 ∈ msgs : (m2.type = “2a”)⇒ (m2.bal 6= b)by 〈4〉3 def Phase2a
〈7〉2. ∀m1, m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : m1 = m2by 〈4〉3 def Phase2a, Send
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈5〉3, 〈2〉1, 〈3〉1 def MsgInv , MsgInv2a
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉2, 〈6〉3, 〈6〉4 def MsgInv2a
〈5〉6. ((m.type = “2b”)⇒ MsgInv2b(m))′ by 〈5〉3, 〈5〉1, m.type = “2b” ⇒ m ∈ msgs ,
〈3〉1, 〈4〉3 def TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv , Phase2a, Send , MsgInv2b
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉4, 〈5〉5, 〈5〉6
〈4〉4 proves MsgInv ′ for Phase2b. Each of 〈5〉2-4 proves a conjunct of MsgInv .
〈4〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove MsgInv ′
〈5〉 suffices assume new m ∈ msgs ′
prove ( ∧ (m.type = “1b”)⇒ MsgInv1b(m) ∧ (m.type = “2a”) ⇒ MsgInv2a(m)
∧ (m.type = “2b”)⇒ MsgInv2b(m))′ by def MsgInv
〈5〉1. pick m1 ∈ msgs : Phase2b(a)!(m1)by 〈4〉4 def Phase2b
〈5〉2 proves MsgInv1b′ forPhase2b. Invariance lemmas do not apply because the 3rd conjunct in MsgInv1b
quantifies over 2b messages negatively —VotedForIn(a, b, s , v) means acceptor a has sent a 2b message
voting 〈b, s , v〉.
〈5〉2. ((m.type = “1b”)⇒ MsgInv1b(m))′
〈6〉 suffices assume (m.type = “1b”)′ prove MsgInv1b(m)′ obvious
〈6〉1. (m.bal ≤ aBal [m.from] ∧ ∀ r ∈ m.voted : VotedForIn(m.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val))′
by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1, 〈4〉4, Phase2bVotedForInv def MsgInv , MsgInv1b, TypeOK ,
Messages , Send
〈6〉2. (∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1 . . m.bal − 1⇒
¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v))′
〈7〉 suffices assume new b ∈ B′, new s ∈ S ′, new v ∈ V ′,
(b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1 . . m.bal − 1)′
prove (¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v))′ obvious
〈7〉1. ¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v)by 〈5〉1 def Send , MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b
〈7〉2. case m.from 6= a ∨ ¬(m1.bal ≥ aBal [a]) by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1, 〈7〉2, 〈7〉1 def VotedForIn,
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TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈7〉3. case m.from = a ∧ (m1.bal ≥ aBal [a])
〈8〉1. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : m2.bal = m1.bal by 〈5〉1, 〈7〉3, 〈6〉1, 〈7〉3 def Send , TypeOK
〈8〉2. ∀m2 ∈ msgs ′ \msgs : m2.bal 6= b by 〈5〉1, 〈7〉3, 〈6〉1, 〈7〉3, 〈8〉1 def TypeOK , Messages
〈8〉 qed by 〈7〉3, 〈7〉1, 〈8〉2 def VotedForIn, TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉 qed by 〈7〉2, 〈7〉3 def TypeOK , Messages
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2 def MsgInv1b
〈5〉3. ((m.type = “2a”)⇒ MsgInv2a(m))′ by SafeAtStable, 〈3〉1, 〈4〉4, 〈2〉1 def MsgInv , MsgInv2a,
TypeOK , Messages , Phase2b, Send
〈5〉4 proves MsgInv2b′. It uses two cases: the second case, 〈6〉2, is for the increment m.
〈5〉4. ((m.type = “2b”)⇒ MsgInv2b(m))′
〈6〉1. case ¬(m1.bal ≥ aBal [a]) ∨m ∈ msgs by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1, 〈6〉1 def TypeOK , Messages ,
Send , MsgInv , MsgInv2b
〈6〉2. case m1.bal ≥ aBal [a] ∧m ∈ msgs ′ \msgs by 〈5〉1, 〈3〉1, 〈6〉2 def TypeOK , Send , MsgInv2b
〈6〉 qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2
〈5〉 qed by 〈5〉2, 〈5〉3, 〈5〉4 def MsgInv2b
〈4〉5 proves MsgInv ′ for Preempt . It uses the invariance lemma for Preempt , since Preempt does not send
messages.
〈4〉5. case ∃ p ∈ P : Preempt(p) by 〈4〉5, PreemptVotedForInv , 〈3〉1, SafeAtStable,
〈2〉1 def Preempt , MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, MsgInv2b
〈4〉 qed by 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈4〉5, 〈2〉1 def Next
〈3〉 qed by 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 def Inv , vars , Next
〈2〉2. case unchanged vars by 〈2〉2 def vars , Inv , TypeOK , AccInv , MsgInv , VotedForIn,
SafeAt , WontVoteIn, MaxBalInSlot , MsgInv1b, MsgInv2a, MsgInv2b
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2
〈1〉 qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTL def Spec
Safety asserts that Spec implies that Safe always holds.
theorem Safety , Spec ⇒ ✷Safe
〈1〉 use def B
〈1〉1. Inv ⇒ Safe
〈2〉 suffices assume Inv , new v1 ∈ V , new v2 ∈ V , new s ∈ S, new b1 ∈ B, new b2 ∈ B,
ChosenIn(b1, s , v1), ChosenIn(b2, s , v2), b1 ≤ b2
prove v1 = v2 by def Safe, Chosen
〈2〉1. case b1 = b2
〈3〉1. ∃ a ∈ A : VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v1) ∧ VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v2)
by 〈2〉1, QuorumAssumption def ChosenIn
〈3〉 qed by 〈3〉1, VotedOnce def Inv
〈2〉2. case b1 < b2
〈3〉1. SafeAt(b2, s , v2)by VotedInv , QuorumAssumption def ChosenIn, Inv
〈3〉2. pick Q1 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q1 : VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v1)by def ChosenIn
〈3〉3. pick Q2 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q2 : VotedForIn(a, b1, s , v2) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b1, s)by 〈3〉1, 〈2〉2 def SafeAt
〈3〉 qed by 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3, QuorumAssumption, VotedOnce def WontVoteIn, Inv
〈2〉 qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2
〈1〉 qed by Invariant , 〈1〉1, PTL
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